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Concluding this volume on children’s cognition, this 
chapter addresses developmental changes in cogni-
tion that extend beyond childhood. I will not trace cog-
nitive change across the entire span of adulthood (for 
lifespan accounts, see Cerella, Rybash, Hoyer, & Com-
mons, 1993; Commons, Richards, & Armon, 1984; 
Craik & Salthouse, 1993; Holliday & Chandler, 1986; 
Hoyer & Rybash, 1994; Kausler, 1994; Lachman & 
Burack, 1993; Miller & Cook-Greuter, 1994; Rybash, 
Hoyer, & Roodin, 1986; Sinnott & Cavanaugh, 1991). 
Rather, I highlight changes associated with the second 
(and to a lesser extent the third) decade of life. Th e re-
search reviewed suggests that developmental changes in 
cognition, at least in some individuals, continue at least 
through adolescence and early adulthood. 
In the opening sections of the chapter, I address a va-
riety of historical, theoretical, and methodological con-
siderations regarding advanced cognitive development. 
I then argue that the central locus of developmen-
tal change in cognition beyond childhood is in reason-
ing—that is, in the deliberate application of epistemic 
constraints to one’s own thinking. Th ree forms of rea-
soning—case-based, law-based, and dialectical—are dis-
tinguished and developmental research relevant to each 
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is reviewed. Finally, I attempt to explain advanced cog-
nitive development by proposing a metacognitive, con-
structivist, and pluralist conception of human rationality. 
HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF 
ADVANCED COGNITION 
Formal Reasoning 
Explicit conceptions about the nature of sophisticated 
reasoning and logic date back at least to Plato and Aris-
totle. Th e psychological study of advanced cognitive de-
velopment can be traced to James Mark Baldwin (1895), 
who postulated a “hyper-logical” stage of mental devel-
opment in which 
syllogistic forms come to have an independent or a 
priori force, and pure thought emerges—thought, 
that is, which thinks of anything or nothing. Th e 
subject of thought has fallen out, leaving the shell 
of form. (1930, p. 23; cited in Cairns, 1983) 
In a similar vein, Piaget (1924/1972) presented early 
evidence that “formal reasoning” begins to be seen about 
the age of 11 or 12. By formal reasoning, Piaget meant 
“formal deduction,” which 
consists in drawing conclusions, not from a fact 
given in immediate observation, nor from a judg-
ment which one holds to be true without any 
qualifi cations (and thus incorporates into reality 
such as one conceives it), but in a judgment which 
one simply assumes, i.e. which one admits without 
believing it, just to see what it will lead to. (p. 69) 
Piaget was clear that logical deduction could be seen in 
children as young as age 7 or 8, but insisted that such 
deduction “bears only upon the beliefs which the child 
has adopted himself ” (p. 67). It is only at age 11 or 12, 
he suggested, that reasoning becomes “hypothetico-de-
ductive” (p. 69). Formal reasoning, in Piaget’s concep-
tion, enables the adolescent to reason strictly about hy-
potheses in a constructed realm of possibility that is 
explicitly distinguished from empirical reality. “To be 
formal,” he proposed, “deduction must detach itself 
from reality and take up its stand upon the plane of the 
purely possible, which is by defi nition the domain of 
hypothesis” (p. 71). 
Baldwin’s theory and the early work of Piaget not-
withstanding, the study of cognitive development be-
yond childhood remained relatively sparse and atheoret-
ical. When Horrocks (1954) wrote what was intended 
as a comprehensive chapter on “Th e Adolescent” for 
the second edition of the present handbook, he de-
voted barely one page to “Intellectual Growth and De-
velopment.” Drawing on a quantitative conception of 
intelligence associated with the psychometric tradition, 
Horrocks’ review of adolescent cognitive development 
focused exclusively on the “rate of mental growth” and 
the age at which such growth ceased. His conclusion was 
that mental growth slows dramatically over the course of 
adolescence and that “in terms of mental ability or power 
the adolescent is nearing his peak” (p. 719). 
Piaget’s Th eory of Formal Operations 
Th e year after Horrocks’ review, Inhelder and Piaget 
(1955/1958) published their classic Th e Growth of Log-
ical Th inking from Childhood to Adolescence, the fi rst full-
length treatment of cognitive development beyond 
childhood. Th e book presented detailed accounts of per-
formance by children and adolescents on a variety of in-
genious tasks designed and administered by Inhelder 
and her associates; as well as an ambitious theoretical ef-
fort by Piaget to characterize and explain the observed 
developmental changes. 
Methodologically, the 15 studies reported in Th e 
Growth of Logical Th inking each involved some sort of 
physical apparatus—fl exible rods, a pendulum, an in-
clined plane, communicating vessels, a hydraulic press, 
or a balance scale. Children ranging in age from 5 
through 16 were encouraged to manipulate the materi-
als and to construct an understanding of the associated 
physical phenomena—for example, the eff ect of poten-
tially relevant variables on the relative fl exibility of the 
rods or on the rate of oscillation of the pendulum. Th ey 
were interviewed individually about their experiments 
and conclusions. As in both prior (e.g., Piaget & Inhel-
der, 1951/1975) and subsequent (e.g., Piaget, 1987) re-
search, responses were interpreted as revealing patterns 
of thinking that were common among adolescents, but 
rarely or never seen prior to age 11. 
In many respects, Piaget’s account of these results was 
continuous with his earliest theorizing about adolescent 
cognition. Formal thinking, he argued 
is essentially hypothetico-deductive. By this we mean 
that the deduction no longer refers directly to per-
ceived realities but to hypothetical statements—i.e., it 
refers to propositions which are formulations of hy-
potheses or which postulate facts or events indepen-
dently of whether or not they actually occur. (p. 251) 
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Th e emphasis on the hypothetical involves a radical 
reconstruction of the perceived relation between realities 
and possibilities. Th at is, 
in formal thought, there is a reversal of the direction 
of thinking between reality and possibility in the sub-
jects’ method of approach. Possibility no longer ap-
pears merely as an extension of an empirical situation 
or of actions actually performed. Instead, it is reality 
that is now secondary to possibility. (p. 251, emphases 
in original) 
Th us, Piaget continued to emphasize the importance 
of formal or hypothetico-deductive reasoning in adoles-
cence. Such reasoning, he argued, is central to formulat-
ing a logically coherent realm of possibilities. Th e for-
mulation of such a realm, in turn, was seen as central to 
a sophisticated understanding of reality. Th at is, reality 
can best be understood within the context of possibil-
ity. Formal understanding, moreover, involves “refl ec-
tive thinking” (p. 342), including critical analysis of one’s 
own thinking and the deliberate construction of theories 
that systematize one’s ideas. 
By 1955, however, Piaget was consolidating the most 
structural phase of his career. Having proposed a set of 
operational structures to explain the reasoning of mid-
dle childhood, he now saw the transition to adolescence 
as involving the construction of second-order, or formal, 
operations involving transformations of fi rst-order, or 
concrete, operations. At a still more technical level, for-
mal operations were characterized as an ensemble des par-
ties or “structured whole” (p. xix, note 18), involving (a) a 
“complete combinatorial system” with the logico-math-
ematical properties of a lattice and (b) the coordination 
of two forms of reversibility—inversion and reciproc-
ity—within the Identity-Negation-Reciprocity-Correl-
ative (INRC) Group. In eff ect, Piaget postulated a ver-
sion of propositional logic as the structure underlying 
formal operational reasoning (Smith, 1987). Although 
Piaget had earlier sketched a structural account of ado-
lescent cognition as “formal operations” (1947/1960, pp. 
147–150), Th e Growth of Logical Th inking was notable for 
a substantial elaboration of his structural theory. Th us, 
the theory of formal reasoning became the theory of for-
mal operations (De Lisi, 1988). 
Inhelder and Piaget’s qualitative account of adoles-
cent cognition as structurally distinct from childhood 
cognition revolutionized the study of adolescent cog-
nitive development. By the 1970s, a substantial body 
of literature concerning Piaget’s theory of formal oper-
ations had emerged. (For a classic Piagetian review, see 
Neimark, 1975; for an early critical review, see Keating, 
1980; for more recent critiques and reformulations, see 
Braine & Rumain, 1983; Byrnes, 1988a, 1988b; Camp-
bell & Bickhard, 1986; Gray, 1990; Halford, 1989; Ke-
ating, 1988, 1990; Smith, 1987.) In recent years, the lit-
erature on cognitive development in adolescence and 
beyond has increasingly transcended the theory of for-
mal operations and branched off  in multiple directions. 
Th e issues highlighted by Piaget, however, continue to 
set much of the agenda for research and theory. 
DOES COGNITION DEVELOP BEYOND 
CHILDHOOD? 
Piaget’s theory claims that (a) developmental changes 
in cognition continue through early adolescence and 
(b) the cognitive structure associated with early adoles-
cence, formal operations, is the fi nal stage of develop-
ment. Both claims are open to question. On one hand, 
extensive evidence of early cognitive competence (De-
Loache, Miller, & Pierroutsakos, this volume; R. Gel-
man & Williams, this volume; S. Gelman & Wellman, 
this volume) raises the possibility that the most funda-
mental aspects of cognition emerge very early; later cog-
nitive changes, it might be argued, are not developmen-
tal in nature. On the other hand, a number of theorists 
have proposed forms of advanced cognition that, they 
suggest, develop in late adolescence or adulthood (Com-
mons et al., 1984; Miller & Cook-Greuter, 1994). Th us, 
Piaget’s theory is challenged both by claims that cogni-
tive development is limited to childhood, and by claims 
that it extends beyond adolescence. 
In order to address the fundamental question of 
whether cognition develops beyond childhood, we must 
consider what we mean by development. Perhaps the 
paradigm case of a developmental change associated 
with adolescence is puberty, the transition to sexual ma-
turity. It may be useful to consider what characteristics 
of this change lead us to construe it as developmental 
in nature. One obvious characteristic is that puberty is 
a long-term change. It occurs over a period of months 
or years, rather than minutes, hours, or days. Th ree addi-
tional characteristics appear worthy of note: 
1. Puberty is a qualitative change. It involves a coordi-
nated transformation of anatomical and physiological 
systems resulting in a structurally distinct state of ma-
turity. In contrast, increasing some number of inches 
in height is not a qualitative transformation. Mere 
growth is not a core example of development. 
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2. Puberty is a progressive change. It has a natural direc-
tion that constitutes progress toward a state of ma-
turity. A transition involving a loss of reproductive 
capacity, by contrast, might be an equally important 
change, but would be less likely to be construed as 
prototypically developmental in nature. 
3. Puberty is an internally-directed change. Although it 
requires environmental support (e.g., adequate nutri-
tion), it is not caused or directed by the environment. 
On the contrary, the transition to sexual maturity is 
typically seen as genetically guided and universal 
across the species. 
It is widely accepted among biologists that certain 
long-term anatomical and physiological changes, such 
as puberty, are qualitative, progressive, and internally-di-
rected to a suffi  cient extent that such changes are use-
fully construed as falling into a category of change that 
may be labeled developmental change. Substantial ev-
idence has led many psychological theorists to posit 
long-term cognitive changes that, like puberty, are suffi  -
ciently qualitative, progressive, and internally-directed to 
be usefully construed as developmental in nature (Case, 
Ch. 15, this Volume; Valsiner, Volume 1). 
Even if cognition does develop, there remains the 
question of whether such development continues beyond 
childhood. A negative answer to that question would 
make this a very short chapter. I hope to demonstrate in 
this section the plausibility of a positive answer but raise 
the possibility that cognitive development beyond child-
hood diff ers in important ways from prototypical exam-
ples of development such as puberty. 
Qualitative Change 
At the historical and theoretical core of the theory of 
formal operations is the postulation of a qualitative shift 
to formal reasoning competence at about age 11 or 12 
(De Lisi, 1988; Piaget, 1924/1972). Research on hypo-
thetico-deductive reasoning has provided substantial ev-
idence for such a qualitative transformation at about this 
age (Markovits & Vachon, 1989; Moshman & Franks, 
1986). A number of more recent theories also postulate 
qualitative changes in cognition beyond childhood. As 
we will see later in this chapter, there is substantial ev-
idence for the existence of types, forms, or levels of cog-
nition that are common among adolescents and adults, 
but rarely seen much before the age of 11 (Basseches, 
1980, 1984; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Case, Ch. 15, 
this Volume; Chandler & Boutilier, 1992; Commons et 
al., 1984; Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Furby & Beyth-Ma-
rom, 1992; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; King & Kitch-
ener, 1994; Klahr, Fay, & Dunbar, 1993; Kohlberg, 1984; 
Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughlin, 1988; Lam-
born, Fischer, & Pipp, 1994; Marini & Case, 1994; Mar-
kovits, 1993; Markovits, Schleifer, & Fortier, 1989; Mar-
kovits & Vachon, 1989, 1990; Moshman, 1990, 1993, 
1995b; Moshman & Franks, 1986; O’Brien, 1987; Over-
ton, 1990; Overton, Ward, Noveck, Black, & O’Brien, 
1987; Ward & Overton, 1990). 
It is far less clear whether there is a general and/or 
structural aspect to such change and, if so, how such 
generality and/or organization is best characterized. If 
change is general across domains, are qualitative shifts in 
multiple domains of cognition simultaneous, or at least 
highly correlated? Are there one or more abstract struc-
tures of cognition that can be applied, perhaps with a 
greater or lesser degree of success, to these domains? 
Th e most infl uential candidate for a very general form 
of cognitive structure has been Piaget’s conceptualiza-
tion of formal operations. As we have seen, the theory 
of formal operations goes beyond Piaget’s early postu-
lation of a qualitative shift to formal reasoning by pos-
tulating a highly abstract logico-mathematical structure 
that forms the basis for a general stage of cognitive de-
velopment. Th is proposal has been highly controversial 
(for diverse views, see Braine & Rumain, 1983; Byrnes, 
1988a, 1988b; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Gray, 1990; 
Halford, 1989; Keating, 1980, 1988, 1990; Neimark, 
1975; Smith, 1987). Even if the theory does provide an 
adequate account of some forms of reasoning, more-
over, it is doubtful that it can fully account for the mul-
tiple forms of advanced cognition to be discussed in this 
chapter (Basseches, 1984; Broughton, 1977; Campbell 
& Bickhard, 1986; Chandler & Boutilier, 1992; Com-
mons et al., 1984; Kitchener & Kitchener, 1981; Pieraut-
Le Bonniec, 1980). 
A central theoretical and methodological issue in ef-
forts to identify and characterize structural transfor-
mation is the fact that qualitatively distinct forms of 
thought and knowledge routinely coexist in the same 
mind (Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995; 
Schauble, 1996; Wark & Krebs, 1996). It often seems 
reasonable to speak of a qualitative shift when an im-
portant new form of cognition appears, even if that 
form does not completely supplant earlier forms. Th e 
appropriate criteria for structural change, however, are 
much less clear. Some researchers attempt to address 
this problem via methodologies that highlight under-
lying competence (Overton, 1990) or optimal level of 
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functioning (Lamborn et al., 1994) rather than typ-
ical behavior. Such methodologies often do yield evi-
dence for general age-related limits on performance 
(Case, Ch. 15, this Volume; Marini & Case, 1994), but 
it remains unclear in what sense there might be general 
and/or structural change in later cognitive development 
(Wark & Krebs, 1996). 
In sum, there do appear to be cognitive changes of a 
qualitative nature beyond childhood. Th e generality and 
organization of such changes, however, are matters of 
dispute. 
Progressive Change 
Another characteristic of developmental change is that 
it is progressive (R. Kitchener, 1986). With respect to 
puberty, it is fairly easy to specify a universally achieved 
state of sexual and reproductive maturity and to assess 
progress toward that state. With respect to cognition, 
a variety of formulations concerning the nature of ma-
turity have been put forward. Th e best-known proposal 
concerning a state of cognitive maturity is Piaget’s ac-
count of formal operations. Other theorists have pro-
posed alternative general conceptions of cognitive matu-
rity (Commons et al., 1984). Riegel (1973) and Basseches 
(1980, 1984), for example, proposed dialectical thinking 
as a general, post-formal, and fi nal stage of cognitive de-
velopment. Finally, some theorists have suggested do-
main-specifi c conceptions of cognitive maturity. Kohl-
berg (1984) posits a highest stage of moral development 
involving an ultimate level of abstract perspective taking. 
King and Kitchener (1994), to take another example, de-
scribe a highest stage in the development of refl ective 
judgment, involving sophisticated conceptions of knowl-
edge and justifi cation. 
Although the existence of a developmental end-
point would indicate the progressive nature of cogni-
tive changes in the direction of that endpoint, the exis-
tence of such an endpoint is not a necessary condition 
for progressive change. Formal operational reasoning, 
for example, is a second-order structure that includes 
and transcends the fi rst-order structure of concrete op-
erations; the transition from concrete to formal opera-
tions can thereby be construed as progress, regardless of 
whether formal operations is a fi nal stage. Similarly, the 
emergence of hypothetico-deductive reasoning may be 
seen as an expansion of the domain of deductive rea-
soning that constitutes progress, regardless of whether 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning is, or leads to, some 
sort of highest stage. Along the same lines, although 
stage theories such as those of Selman (1980), Kohlberg 
(1984), and King and Kitchener (1994) typically posit a 
highest stage, one can often make a strong case for each 
stage representing progress over the stage before with-
out demonstrating that each stage increasingly approx-
imates a mature state yet to come. Such a case might 
be made, for example, by showing that the later stage is 
more diff erentiated, integrated, organized, metacogni-
tive, refl ective, and/or adaptive (Campbell & Bickhard, 
1986; Valsiner, Ch. 4, Volume 1). 
Cross-sectional research suffi  ces to demonstrate that 
some forms of cognition typically appear later than 
others. Longitudinal and cross-cultural evidence may 
strengthen the case that certain developmental sequences 
are invariant across individuals and cultures (Boyes & 
Walker, 1988; Kohlberg, 1984; Snarey, 1985). To make 
the case for cognitive progress, however, requires a dem-
onstration that later cognitions are in some sense better, 
an epistemological claim that cannot be supported sim-
ply on the basis of empirical evidence. A key issue in the 
study of cognitive progress, then, is the theoretical coor-
dination of empirical and epistemological considerations 
(R. Kitchener, 1986; Piaget, 1985; Smith, 1993). 
As we will see throughout this chapter, a strong case 
can be made for progressive changes in cognition dur-
ing adolescence and early adulthood. Th e existence of 
mature cognitive states, however, and the nature of 
any such developmental endpoints, remain matters of 
dispute. 
Internally Directed Change 
Finally, there is the question of whether cognitive transi-
tions beyond childhood are internally directed. Th e most 
obvious sense in which a change may be internally di-
rected is that it is guided by the genes. Many of the most 
important genetically guided changes with respect to 
anatomy and physiology are universal across the species. 
Research on young children has led many theorists to 
the view that early cognitive development is to a large 
degree guided by innate constraints that are universal 
across individuals and cultures (Gelman & Williams, 
Ch. 12, this Volume; Karmiloff -Smith, 1992; Spelke & 
Newport, Ch. 6, Volume 1). Nevertheless, it does not 
follow that cognitive change is directed or determined 
by genes; any such conclusion would be especially dubi-
ous with respect to later cognitive transitions. 
Th ere is another sense, however, in which cognitive 
change might be said to be internally directed. A con-
structivist view of cognition posits an epistemic subject 
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or rational agent actively constructing new knowledge 
and forms of thinking on the basis of his or her own 
perceptions and reasons. Although the constructive ac-
tivities of such a subject are not genetically determined, 
they are nonetheless internal to the rational agent, rather 
than caused by the environment. Without positing ei-
ther genetic determinism or universality across the spe-
cies, a constructivist conception does suggest an im-
portant sense in which cognitive change is internally 
directed (Bidell, Lee, Bouchie, Ward, & Brass, 1994; 
Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Karmiloff -Smith, 1992; R. 
Kitchener, 1986; Moshman, 1994, 1995a, 1995b; Piaget, 
1985; Smith, 1993). 
One useful approach to investigating the internally-
directed nature of change is microgenetic research, in 
which subjects are observed over a period of time in a 
rich task environment to see how they construct and ap-
ply skills that are not directly taught (Schauble, 1990, 
1996). Kuhn et al. (1995), for example, studied changes 
in the coordination of theories and evidence by children 
and adults over a series of ten sessions. Th ey found prog-
ress in the ability to coordinate theories and evidence de-
spite the absence of direct teaching, suggesting an inner-
directed process of change. Th e fact that both children 
and adults made substantial progress in a relatively short 
period of time suggests a constructive process rather 
than a genetically based process of maturation. 
Cross-cultural research provides another avenue for 
identifying changes that are not simply instilled by par-
ticular environments (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Snarey, 
1985). Outside the realm of moral cognition, however, 
cross-cultural research on advanced cognitive develop-
ment is rare. 
As we will see, a strong theoretical and empirical case 
can be made for long-term cognitive changes that are 
internally directed. At advanced levels, however, there is 
no evidence that any such changes are genetically driven, 
and it is unclear what internally directed changes, if any, 
are universal across the species. 
Conclusion 
Th roughout this chapter, we will see evidence for cogni-
tive changes beyond childhood suffi  ciently like puberty 
to be labeled “developmental.” Our core conception of 
development comes from the realm of biology, however, 
and may be misleading in the realm of cognition. We 
should not assume that everything we might call cog-
nitive development has all those characteristics that lead 
us to construe puberty as a developmental change. As 
we will see, it appears that there are indeed long-term 
changes in cognition that are qualitative, progressive, 
and internally directed; some such changes, moreover, 
continue into adolescence and beyond. It is doubtful 
that late cognitive changes are genetically driven, how-
ever. It remains unclear, moreover, in what respects, if 
any, advanced cognitive changes are structural, general 
across domains, aimed at one or more specifi c endpoints, 
or universal across persons and cultures (Hoyer & Ry-
bash, 1994; Miller & Cook-Greuter, 1994; Rybash et al., 
1986). Th ese are questions to which we will return. 
FROM INFERENCE TO REASONING 
Cognition is generally construed to be inferential in that 
it routinely goes beyond the data at hand. In the present 
section, I will: (a) defi ne thinking as an advanced form 
of inference; (b) defi ne reasoning as an advanced form 
of thinking; (c) consider the specifi city and generality of 
reasoning; and (d) suggest that reasoning is the primary 
locus of late developmental changes in cognition. 
From Inference to Th inking 
Inference may be defi ned as the generation of new cog-
nitions from old. Inferential processing is central to most 
areas of human cognition and is typically automatic 
and unconscious. Reading, for example, routinely in-
volves inferences that go beyond the text (Lea, O’Brien, 
Fisch, Noveck, & Braine, 1990). Similarly, eff ective so-
cial interaction involves an ongoing stream of inferences 
about the moods, meanings, and intentions of those with 
whom we interact (Hilton, 1995). 
Th inking may be defi ned as the deliberate coordina-
tion of one’s inferences to serve one’s purposes (Mosh-
man, 1995a). We think, for example, in order to solve a 
problem, make a decision, plan a project, justify a claim, 
or test a hypothesis. Th us defi ned, thinking is not limited 
to late development, nor does it ever replace elemen-
tary inference. Young children think, and adults continue 
to make automatic and unconscious inferences. Nev-
ertheless, the emergence of thinking represents an im-
portant advance in the nature and use of inference. Re-
search shows development at least through adolescence 
in problem solving (Foltz, Overton, & Ricco, 1995), de-
cision making (Byrnes & McClenny, 1994; Furby & 
Beyth-Marom, 1992), planning (Lachman & Burack, 
1993; Scholnick & Friedman, 1993), hypothesis testing 
(Kuhn et al., 1988), and other types of thinking. 
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From Th inking to Reasoning 
Because thinking is purposeful, an act of thinking may 
be evaluated with respect to how well it serves the pur-
poses of the thinker. Over the course of development, 
thinkers increasingly make such evaluations themselves 
and attempt to improve their inferential activities. Rec-
ognizing that some thought processes are more justifi -
able than others, they increasingly construct standards of 
rationality and apply these to their own thinking. To the 
extent that an individual attempts to constrain his or her 
thinking on the basis of a self-imposed standard of ra-
tionality, we may say the individual is engaged in rea-
soning. Reasoning, then, is epistemologically self-con-
strained thinking (Moshman, 1995a). 
Consider, for example, developmental changes in de-
cision making. At a primitive level, an individual might 
pursue a course of action on the basis of available infor-
mation without any intent to select from two or more 
options or awareness of having done so. A psychologist 
studying this cognitive process might determine what 
inferences the individual made and might evaluate the 
adequacy of those inferences, but it would be misleading 
to say the individual has made a decision. 
At a more advanced level, an individual understands 
that there are two or more options available, makes a 
series of inferences intended to determine the best op-
tion, and then consciously chooses that option. Such 
decision making may be usefully regarded as an act of 
thinking. 
Research suggests that for at least some individuals, 
the quality of decision making continues to improve at 
least through adolescence (Byrnes & McClenny, 1994). 
A plausible explanation for this is: Over the course of 
development, individuals become increasingly successful 
in constraining their inferences to conform to increas-
ingly justifi able norms. Some such norms may be spe-
cifi c to making decisions, whereas others may be appli-
cable to multiple types of thinking. 
At least three general forms of reasoning—to be dis-
cussed in the next three sections of this chapter—may 
play roles in decision making and other types of think-
ing. First, the decision maker may purposely choose the 
option most similar to one that has been successful in 
the past. Th is is analogical reasoning, a type of case-
based reasoning. Second, the decision maker may de-
liberately constrain his or her inferences to conform to 
rules of logic or other epistemic laws. Such law-based 
reasoning is the focus of extensive developmental theory 
and research. Finally, the decision maker may move pro-
gressively toward a decision via some form of dialectical 
refl ection or argumentation. 
Developmental changes in problem solving may sim-
ilarly refl ect the emergence and application of epistemic 
self-constraints. Foltz et al. (1995), for example, assessed 
fi fth- and eighth-graders on formal logical reasoning and 
presented each with a problem involving identifi cation 
of a hidden fi gure. Formal reasoning competence was 
associated with the use of deductive proof construction 
strategies that enabled more effi  cient problem solving by 
avoiding the generation of redundant information. 
Th is theoretical approach to thinking and reasoning 
has important methodological implications. Given the 
proposed defi nitions, an automatic inference is not an 
act of thinking and does not constitute reasoning, even 
if the inference conforms to logical, mathematical, or 
other epistemic norms. Correspondingly, a deliberate ef-
fort to constrain one’s thinking on the basis of what one 
believes to be justifi able epistemic norms constitutes rea-
soning, even if the norms are not successfully applied or 
are demonstrably inappropriate. Bad reasoning, in this 
view, is still reasoning, whereas good inferences do not 
necessarily involve reasoning at all. 
In assessing reasoning, then, it is not suffi  cient to pres-
ent a task and see if subjects reach the logically or mathe-
matically proper conclusion. Such an approach will over-
estimate reasoning competence in cases where automatic 
inferences suffi  ce to reach the approved conclusion; it 
will underestimate reasoning competence in cases where 
deliberate eff orts to constrain thinking do not suffi  ce to 
generate the approved conclusion. As we will see, these 
are important considerations in attempting to reconcile 
the extensive literatures purporting to demonstrate logi-
cal, mathematical, and scientifi c reasoning in young chil-
dren and the fundamental irrationality of adults (Hilton, 
1995; Jones & Harris, 1982; Markovits, Schleifer, & For-
tier, 1989; Moshman & Franks, 1986). 
Specifi city and Generality of Reasoning 
An important issue in the study of cognition revolves 
around questions of specifi city and generality. Rather 
than reduce this issue to a simplistic dichotomy of do-
main specifi city versus generality, it will be useful to con-
sider the various ways in which reasoning could be spe-
cifi c or general. 
One way reasoning could be specifi c is with respect to 
domains of knowledge. Recent research with young chil-
dren has suggested that they routinely construct knowl-
edge within distinct domains such as physical causality, 
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biological systems, social relations, and morality (Flavell 
& Miller, Ch. 17, this Volume; R. Gelman & Williams, 
Ch. 12, this Volume; S. Gelman & Wellman, Ch. 15, this 
Volume; Helwig, 1995b; Karmiloff -Smith, 1992; Marat-
sos, Ch. 9, this Volume; Spelke & Newport, Ch. 6, Vol-
ume 1). Such knowledge enables sophisticated patterns 
of inference within such domains. Domain-specifi c in-
ferences undoubtedly play an important role in cogni-
tion at all ages. To the extent that people refl ect on the 
epistemic properties of domain-specifi c inferences, they 
may construct forms of reasoning specifi c to particular 
inferential domains. 
A second way reasoning could be specifi c is with re-
spect to types of thinking. Problem solving, decision 
making, hypothesis testing, and planning, for exam-
ple, might each involve distinct forms of epistemic con-
straint and thus constitute or generate distinct forms of 
reasoning. 
A third possibility is that there are two or more dis-
tinct forms of reasoning applicable to multiple types of 
thinking and multiple domains of knowledge and infer-
ence. In the next three sections of this chapter, I suggest 
that three such forms of reasoning—case-based, law-
based, and dialectical—can be distinguished and that 
each continues to develop long beyond childhood. With-
out denying the importance of domain-specifi c patterns 
of inference and distinct types of thinking, I suggest that 
each of these three forms of reasoning is applicable to 
various types of thinking and multiple domains of in-
ference. With respect to specifi city and generality, there 
are specifi c forms of reasoning, but each is general across 
types of thinking and domains of inference. 
Finally, there remains the possibility that we can iden-
tify still broader generalities. Individuals may, for ex-
ample, achieve levels of metacognitive understanding 
about the nature of inference that transcend domains of 
knowledge, types of thinking, and forms of reasoning. 
Research relevant to specifi city and generality will be re-
viewed later in the chapter. First, in the next three sec-
tions, we consider three fundamental forms of reasoning. 
CASE-BASED REASONING 
Case-based reasoning is thinking constrained by atten-
tion to concrete manifestations (cases) that are deemed 
relevant to achieving a justifi able cognitive outcome in 
the case at hand. Two categories of case-based reason-
ing may be distinguished: analogical reasoning and prec-
edent-based reasoning. 
Analogical Reasoning 
In analogical inference, a situation or issue is consid-
ered on the basis of other situations or exemplars. For 
example, one may approach a problem in a manner con-
strained by one’s perception of how a relevantly simi-
lar problem has been solved or may categorize a phe-
nomenon on the basis of its similarities to phenomena 
already categorized. Medin and Ross (1989) argue that 
problem solving and categorization often rely more on 
such use of concrete examples than on abstractions of 
any sort. Similarly, Halford (1992) notes that transi-
tive inferences and understanding of class inclusion re-
lations may involve use of analogy. Given that A is lon-
ger than B and B is longer than C, for example, a child 
may conclude that A is longer than C by analogy with 
the spatial relations of top, middle, and bottom. Th ere 
is substantial evidence that detection, construction, and 
utilization of analogical relations is routine even in pre-
school children (DeLoache et al., Ch. 16, this Volume; 
Goswami, 1991). 
Th e fact that young children make analogical infer-
ences, however, does not show that they intended to 
make such inferences, that they have conscious control of 
those inferences, or that they understand the epistemic 
basis for such inferences. Th e emergence of analogical 
thinking may be identifi ed when a child purposely seeks 
guidance from cases specifi cally deemed to be analogous. 
Such thinking may be identifi ed as analogical reasoning, 
to the extent that the choice of analog and its applica-
tion to the issue at hand are deemed justifi able by the 
thinker. Analogical reasoning, that is, is rooted in con-
ceptual understanding about the epistemic advantages of 
using certain kinds of analogies in certain kinds of sit-
uations. Such (metacognitive) knowledge about analogy 
makes it possible for relevant similarities and diff erences 
to be deliberately assessed and coordinated. 
Th e transition from inference to reasoning in the use 
of analogy has been examined via classical analogies of 
the form a is to b as c is to d. Full comprehension of such 
analogies requires not only simultaneous attention to 
two fi rst-order relations (that of a to b and that of c to d), 
but explicit recognition of the asserted second-order re-
lation of equality between the two fi rst-order relations 
(a is to b as c is to d). Piaget’s theory postulates that the 
second-order operations necessary for such comprehen-
sion do not develop until the emergence of formal oper-
ations at age 11. 
Methodologically, identifi cation of second-order re-
lational reasoning requires evidence that the child ex-
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plicitly compared the two fi rst-order relations. Given 
the analogical question Hand is to fi nger as foot is to 
what, for example, a response of toe shows analogical 
reasoning only if there is evidence that the thinker ex-
plicitly considered the relation of fi nger to hand and 
deliberately sought a response that is related to foot in 
a similar way. At the very least, this requires evidence 
that toe would not be a spontaneous response to foot 
outside the context of the given analogy. A more strin-
gent criterion is that the thinker can adequately justify 
his or her response and explain its superiority to alter-
native possibilities. 
Research on classical analogy problems (carefully 
constructed to require systematic attention to the sec-
ond-order relationship) indicates that analogical reason-
ing emerges long after simple analogical inferences, and 
continues to develop at least through adolescence (Gold-
man, Pellegrino, Parseghian, & Sallis, 1982; Sternberg & 
Nigro, 1980; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979). Ability to ex-
plain and justify responses, moreover, is strongly corre-
lated with the proportion of normatively correct conclu-
sions (Goldman et al., 1982). Research and theory of the 
past decade, however, have focused more on the early de-
velopment (Goswami, 1991) and pervasive nature (Hal-
ford, 1992) of analogical inference (DeLoache et al., Ch. 
16, this Volume). Further research on the deliberate and 
refl ective use of such inference—that is, on analogical 
reasoning—would be welcome. It is here that late devel-
opmental trends are likely to be found. 
Th is does not necessarily mean a return to classi-
cal analogy problems, however. Two key limitations of 
such tasks is that they explicitly request analogical rea-
soning and highlight the relations to be considered. Fu-
ture research might focus on how individuals (a) decide 
to seek or use an analogy, (b) consciously identify po-
tentially analogous cases, and (c) deliberately assess the 
relevance of those cases via systematic consideration of 
similarities and diff erences. Th ese are sophisticated com-
petencies that likely develop in adolescence and beyond, 
but remain largely unexplored. 
Precedent-Based Reasoning 
Precedent-based reasoning resembles analogical reason-
ing in that analogous instances provide a basis for con-
straining one’s thinking. In analogical reasoning, how-
ever, the analogous instances are merely heuristic. In 
precedent-based reasoning, on the other hand, applica-
tion of the precedent forms a stricter constraint. Fidel-
ity to precedent is considered mandatory; apparent de-
viations from precedent require specifi c justifi cation. 
Precedent-based reasoning is important, for example, to 
certain kinds of legal thinking. In resolving a case, the 
previous resolution of a relevantly similar case is not 
merely an example of how the present case might be 
handled, but a fundamental constraint on the legitimacy 
of any solution (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992; Riss-
land, 1991). 
Research on precedent-based reasoning is sparse. It 
seems plausible, however, to posit a developmental trend 
from (a) implicit analogical inference with no diff eren-
tiation of precedent from analogous instance to (b) ex-
plicit recognition of precedent as a distinct type of anal-
ogous instance that is to some degree binding, and later 
toward (c) increasing recognition of the role of current 
choices in setting new precedents and thus constraining 
future choices. 
Consider, for example, a teacher’s response to stu-
dent behavior that is morally dubious but does not 
clearly violate any specifi c rule. Even a young child may 
see previous responses to such behavior as relevant to 
the current incident. A more advanced reasoner may 
explicitly recognize the moral force of precedent: Pun-
ishment of the current behavior is more clearly unfair, 
for example, if another child previously went unpun-
ished for the same behavior. Still more advanced indi-
viduals may evaluate a teacher’s response to ambiguous 
behavior with respect to the precedent that response 
sets for the future. 
It seems likely, then, that development of case-based 
reasoning includes (a) a developmental trend from auto-
matic analogical inference to increasingly self-conscious 
analogical reasoning and (b) in domains such as law and 
morality, an increasingly diff erentiated conception of 
binding precedents as distinct from heuristic analogies. 
Such developmental trends, which have received surpris-
ingly little attention from researchers and theorists, al-
most surely continue into adolescence and beyond. 
Legal Reasoning 
Legal thinking may be defi ned as thinking aimed at de-
termining what the law requires or forbids. It is often ar-
gued that legal education should be aimed at teaching a 
student how to “think like a lawyer,” that is, to engage in 
legal reasoning. To refer to legal reasoning is to assume 
the existence of a particular form of epistemic constraint 
that is central and/or unique to legal thinking. 
As already noted, precedent-based reasoning is im-
portant in many legal contexts. It is far from clear, how-
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ever, that precedent-based reasoning is either central or 
unique to legal thinking. With respect to centrality, note 
that laws typically take the form of rules and that judi-
cial decisions often apply and/or provide general prin-
ciples; thus determination of what the law requires or 
forbids may involve rule-based or principled reason-
ing (to be discussed in the next section). With respect 
to uniqueness, it has already been noted that precedent-
based reasoning is important to morality as well as law. 
If there is no form of reasoning central and/or unique 
to the domain of law, however, it may be misleading to 
speak of legal reasoning. Perhaps it would be more ap-
propriate to focus on the application of general forms of 
reasoning (such as case-based, law-based, and dialectical 
reasoning) to specifi c domains of knowledge and action 
(such as law). 
Th is is an issue to which we will return. First, how-
ever, there are other forms of reasoning to be considered. 
LAW-BASED REASONING 
Law-based reasoning is thinking constrained by the de-
liberate application of abstract laws that are construed 
by the individual as justifying his or her beliefs and/or 
actions. Two general categories of laws may be distin-
guished: rules and principles. I begin this section by con-
sidering logical reasoning, a form of rule-based reason-
ing that continues to develop well beyond childhood. I 
then turn to other types of rule-based reasoning. Next, I 
address principled reasoning as a form of reasoning that 
is law-based, but not rule-based. Finally, I raise the ques-
tion of whether scientifi c thinking constitutes a distinct 
category of law-based reasoning. 
Logical Reasoning 
Knowing that a hidden ball is red or blue and that it is not 
red, 3-year-old Ellen concludes that the ball is blue. From 
an external perspective, we may theorize that Ellen has 
made an inference of the form p or q; not p; therefore q. Be-
cause the conclusion necessarily follows from the prem-
ises, we may designate this a deductive inference. Even 
if Ellen has indeed made this deductive inference, how-
ever, many questions remain: Did she intend to reach a 
conclusion? Did she construe the relevant portion of her 
knowledge as a set of premises? Does she know that she 
has made an inference? Does she know that her conclu-
sion follows necessarily from her premises? Is the infer-
ence deductive from her point of view, or only from ours? 
Children and adults routinely make inferences that 
can reasonably be construed as involving the applica-
tion of logical rules (Braine, 1990; Braine & O’Brien, 
1991; DeLoache et al., Ch. 16, this Volume; Falmagne 
& Gonsalves, 1995; Hawkins, Pea, Glick, & Scribner, 
1984; Lea et al., 1990; O’Brien, 1987; Rips, 1994; Schol-
nick, 1990; Scholnick & Wing, 1995; Smith, Langston, 
.& Nisbett, 1992). Logical inference gives rise to logi-
cal thinking as children become increasingly purposeful 
in the application and coordination of such rules. Log-
ical thinking, in turn, gives rise to logical reasoning as 
individuals increasingly grasp the epistemic properties 
of logical rules (Keenan, Ruff man, & Olson, 1994). Th e 
transition from deductive inference to deductive rea-
soning, for example, involves increasingly explicit un-
derstanding about the logical necessity of deductions 
(Moshman, 1990). 
Studies by Overton and his associates (reviewed 
in Overton, 1990) suggest that the emergence of logi-
cal reasoning from logical inference is an extended pro-
cess that typically continues long beyond childhood. In 
one line of investigation, children and adolescents rang-
ing from Grades 4 through 12 were presented with the 
four-card selection task, a much-studied conditional rea-
soning problem (Overton et al., 1987; Ward & Overton, 
1990). Th e task involves a proposition of the form if p 
then q and four potential sources of information about 
the truth or falsity of that proposition. Specifi cally, the 
thinker may choose to investigate (a) whether a given p 
is associated with q or with not-q; (b) whether a given 
not-p is associated with q or with not-q; (c) whether a 
given q is associated with p or with not-p; and/or (d) 
whether a given not-q is associated with p or with not-
p. Solution of the task requires the insight that only the 
combination p and not-q falsifi es a proposition of the 
form if p then q. Th us investigations a and d are relevant 
to the truth of the conditional proposition because they 
could falsify it, whereas investigations b and c are unnec-
essary because no possible result of these investigations 
would disconfi rm the conditional proposition. Although 
young children routinely make simple conditional infer-
ences (Scholnick, 1990; Scholnick & Wing, 1995), the 
selection task is notoriously diffi  cult even for college stu-
dents (Evans, 1989; Newstead & Evans, 1995). 
Part of the diffi  culty of the selection task is that the 
thinker must do more than simply generate a conclusion 
from premises using a conditional inference rule. Rather, 
the thinker must coordinate a variety of hypotheti-
cal conditional relations, including (a) the given condi-
tional proposition, which the thinker knows may be true 
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or false, and (b) the implications of each of the two pos-
sible results for each of the four potential investigations. 
Although some versions of the selection task are rarely 
solved by individuals of any age, Overton and his asso-
ciates showed dramatic increases over the course of ad-
olescence in the ability to solve meaningful variations of 
the task. Th e eff ects of content raise issues of generality 
that will be addressed later. Th e developmental trends, 
however, are consistent with a conception of conditional 
reasoning as a late-developing form of thinking involv-
ing deliberate coordination of conditional inferences on 
the basis of explicit understanding about the nature and 
justifi ability of conditional inference rules. 
In a more direct approach to assessing the develop-
ment of understanding about the nature of logic, Mosh-
man and Franks (1986) presented 197 individuals 
in Grades 4 (ages 9 to 10), 7 (ages 12 to 13), and col-
lege (ages 18 to 43) with a variety of logic-related tasks. 
Some of these simply required participants to make a 
correct inference from a set of premises. Performance on 
the simple inference tasks was nearly perfect at all ages 
across a variety of logical forms. 
Other tasks involved the same logical forms, but required 
metalogical judgments about entire arguments. In a va-
riety of conditions across three studies, participants were 
asked to sort, rank, and evaluate arguments varying with 
respect to: (a) form; (b) content; (c) empirical truth of 
the premises; (d) empirical truth of the conclusion; and 
(e) validity (i.e., whether the conclusion followed from 
the premises). Of central concern was whether partici-
pants would distinguish validity from truth, recogniz-
ing that (a) an argument in which the conclusion follows 
logically from the premises is valid even if the prem-
ises and/or conclusion are false, and (b) an argument in 
which the conclusion does not follow logically from the 
premises is not valid, even if the premises and/or conclu-
sion are true. 
As expected, truth was a salient consideration at all 
ages. In cases where truth status and validity were in 
confl ict, even college students often had diffi  culty focus-
ing on the latter. Th ere were substantial age diff erences, 
however. Most college students clearly understood the 
metalogical distinction between valid and invalid argu-
ments and applied this distinction spontaneously, albeit 
inconsistently. Seventh graders were usually less spon-
taneous in their application of the concept of valid-
ity but nevertheless, in supportive circumstances, most 
showed genuine understanding. Fourth graders, by con-
trast, generally failed to distinguish validity from truth, 
even in conditions where they were provided with def-
initions, examples, and/or feedback concerning the na-
ture of validity. 
Related research by Markovits and his associates 
(Markovits & Bouff ard-Bouchard, 1992; Markovits 
& Nantel, 1989; Markovits & Vachon, 1989; see also 
Efklides, Demetriou, & Metallidou, 1994) has shown 
that the ability to deduce conclusions from premises ex-
plicitly known to be hypothetical or false shows substan-
tial development over the course of adolescence. Mar-
kovits and Bouff ard-Bouchard (1992), moreover, found 
a positive relationship between (a) explicit knowledge 
about the distinction between inferential validity and 
empirical truth and (b) reasoning in accord with logical 
norms. Metalogical insight does not guarantee perfect 
reasoning, but may facilitate the application of logical 
rules to abstract content and the successful coordination 
of inferences on complex logical tasks. 
Such fi ndings are consistent with the core Piaget-
ian claim that formal or hypothetico-deductive reason-
ing develops much later than competence in elementary 
logical inference. Without indicating a sudden transi-
tion at any particular age, developmental research on 
logical reasoning suggests that formal reasoning is com-
mon (albeit inconsistent) in adolescents and adults, but 
rarely seen much before the age of 11. Th is is not to 
say, however, that formal reasoning rests on formal op-
erations. Th e transition from logical inference to logi-
cal reasoning may have less to do with logical structure 
than with the thinker’s metacognitive attitude toward 
the propositions under consideration (Campbell & 
Bickhard, 1986). 
Logical reasoning, then, seems to emerge long af-
ter logical inference. Although young children routinely 
make inferences in accord with rules of logic, only later 
in development do individuals increasingly think about 
such rules and understand their epistemic role in justify-
ing connections among propositions. Th e construction of 
such metacognitive knowledge about logic may account 
for late developmental trends in the deliberate applica-
tion and coordination of logical rules.
Rule-Based Reasoning 
Although logical reasoning is the most researched form 
of rule-based reasoning, similar trends from rule-based 
inference to rule-based reasoning can be identifi ed with 
respect to other systems of rules. In a classic investiga-
tion of the development of probabilistic concepts, Piaget 
and Inhelder (1951/1975) interviewed children and ad-
olescents of ages 3 through 15 about chance phenom-
  David Moshman in HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOG Y, v. . COGNITION, PERCEPTION, AND LANGUAGE ()
ena involving balls, coins, cards, marbles, counters, toy 
men, and a spinner rigged with hidden magnets. Results 
showed developmental changes extending through early 
adolescence in conceptual knowledge about randomness, 
proportionality, normal distribution, the law of large 
numbers, and combinatorial possibilities. Unlike children 
under age 11, adolescents were frequently able to devise 
systems for generating all possible permutations, combi-
nations, or other arrangements of a set of elements. Ex-
plicit knowledge of combinatorial possibilities, argued 
Piaget and Inhelder, provides the basis for insight into 
statistical regularities and thus for rule-based reasoning 
about patterns and distributions of chance events. 
Research over the past several decades has shown that 
elementary laws of probability are implicit in the proba-
bilistic inferences of children as young as age 4 (Huber 
& Huber, 1987). Consistent with Piaget and Inhelder’s 
fi ndings, however, it appears that probabilistic and pro-
portional reasoning develop over a period extending well 
into adolescence (Ahl, Moore, & Dixon, 1992; Dixon & 
Moore, 1996; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1986; Moore, Dixon, 
& Haines, 1991). Sophisticated probabilistic concepts 
and associated forms of reasoning, in fact, remain elu-
sive even in adults ( Jones & Harris, 1982; Kosonen & 
Winne, 1995). 
One area of probabilistic reasoning in which late de-
velopmental trends have received substantial attention 
is correlational reasoning. Th e standard methodological 
paradigm, devised by Inhelder and Piaget (1958), is to 
present children and/or adults with frequency data al-
lowing judgments about the covariation of two dichot-
omous variables. For example, given information about 
the frequency of each of four potential combinations of 
hair color and eye color—dark hair/dark eyes; dark hair/
light eyes; light hair/dark eyes; light hair/light eyes—it 
is possible to determine the direction and magnitude of 
the correlation, if any, between hair color and eye color. 
Although correlational inferences can be made from iso-
lated bits of data, defensible conclusions about the ex-
istence and direction of a correlation require appropri-
ate coordination of frequencies with respect to each of 
the four possible combinations. Research indicates that 
systematic application of sophisticated rules for assess-
ing covariation in such data continues to develop at least 
through adolescence (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958), with 
substantial variation in adult performance (Shaklee, 
Holt, Elek, & Hall, 1988). 
In many studies of logical and mathematical cogni-
tion, response patterns across carefully designed varia-
tions of standard tasks suggest the rule-based nature of 
subjects’ inferences and judgments. Th rough systematic 
application of this rule-assessment methodology, Siegler 
(1981) has demonstrated that even young children use 
rules in responding to a variety of tasks. His research has 
indicated developmental trends in multiple domains to-
ward increasingly systematic coordination of such rules. 
In addition to logical and mathematical rules, indi-
viduals may also apply a variety of social and moral rules. 
Although such rules may be identifi ed in the ongoing 
social and moral inferences of young children, increas-
ingly sophisticated conceptual knowledge regarding the 
nature and justifi cation of such rules may underlie the 
long-term construction of social and moral reasoning 
through adolescence and, for many, well into adulthood 
(Moshman, 1995b). 
Holyoak and Cheng (1995a, 1995b) have proposed 
that people often solve logical reasoning tasks by assim-
ilating them to their knowledge of certain kinds of so-
cial, moral, and legal rules. Depending on content and 
context, for example, a conditional of the form if p then 
q might be construed as a deontic statement of permis-
sion or obligation (e.g., if you are at least 21 years old, 
then you may drink beer). Th is may activate a pragmatic 
reasoning schema that might suffi  ce to solve the task in 
question. Research with variations of the selection task 
has indicated that pragmatic reasoning schemas may en-
able appropriate selections by adults (Holyoak & Cheng, 
1995a, 1995b; Manktelow & Over, 1995) and by chil-
dren as young as age 7 (Girotto, Blaye, & Farioli, 1989; 
Girotto, Gilly, Blaye, & Light, 1989; Light, Blaye, Gilly, 
& Girotto, 1989). 
Th e work on pragmatic reasoning schemas suggests 
that rule-based inference and reasoning often rely on 
content-specifi c social and moral rules, rather than on 
more abstract logical rules. A more radical approach en-
tirely rejects the assumption that people engage in rule-
based inference or reasoning. Johnson-Laird and Byrne 
(1991; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992) have 
argued that reasoning involves the construction and ma-
nipulation of concrete mental models of potential states 
of aff airs and is thus a semantic, rather than a formal or 
syntactic, process. Reasoning does not require the ap-
plication of rules, at least none that can be designated 
as logical. Developmental changes in reasoning, in this 
view, refl ect (a) emergence of the linguistic ability to 
comprehend logical terms in the premises (e.g., all, some, 
none, if, and, or, and not), and thus construct appropri-
ate models of the premises, and (b) improvements in the 
manipulation of these models due to the growth of pro-
cessing capacity ( Johnson-Laird, 1990). 
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Although theorists generally agree that children 
and adults can and do use pragmatic reasoning sche-
mas and mental models for a variety of cognitive pur-
poses, including solving many kinds of logical problems, 
most argue that people also apply logical and other rules 
(Braine, 1990; Braine & O’Brien, 1991; DeLoache et al., 
Ch. 16, this Volume; Nisbett, Fong, Lehman, & Cheng, 
1987; O’Brien, Braine, & Yang, 1994; Scholnick, 1990; 
Sloman, 1996; E. E. Smith et al., 1992; L. Smith, 1993). 
Consistent with the view that people use both rules and 
models, Markovits (1993; Markovits & Vachon, 1990) 
has proposed a theoretical integration of Piagetian and 
information-processing approaches to conditional rea-
soning in which developing conceptions of necessity and 
possibility (Piaget, 1987) are associated with qualitative 
transitions to increasingly abstract uses of mental mod-
els over the course of childhood and adolescence. 
We may thus posit a category of rule-based reasoning 
including, but not limited to, logical and mathematical 
reasoning. Regardless of the specifi c rules involved, rule-
based inference gives rise to rule-based thinking as chil-
dren become increasingly purposeful in the application 
and coordination of rules (Zelazo, Reznick, & Piñon, 
1995). Rule-based thinking, in turn, gives rise to rule-
based reasoning as individuals increasingly grasp the 
epistemic properties of their rules (Keenan et al., 1994; 
Moshman, 1995a, 1995b). 
Methodologically, then, a key criterion for demon-
strating that an individual has engaged in rule-based 
reasoning is evidence that the individual is purposely ap-
plying what she or he deems to be epistemologically jus-
tifi able rules. Strict application of this criterion may be 
useful in resolving the apparent paradox that young chil-
dren routinely make inferences in accord with logical, 
mathematical, and other norms (Braine, 1990; Hawkins 
et al., 1984; Huber & Huber, 1987; Scholnick, 1990; 
Scholnick & Wing, 1995), whereas adults routinely 
make inferences that deviate systematically from such 
norms (Evans, 1989; Newstead & Evans, 1995).
With respect to young children, task demands are of-
ten such that genuine reasoning is unnecessary. Hawkins 
et al. (1984), for example, showed that young children 
can reach correct conclusions from various sets of prem-
ises. Markovits et al. (1989) replicated these fi ndings, 
but showed that removing the logical connections across 
premises made little diff erence in young children’s re-
sponses, with increasing attention to logical form over 
the course of later childhood. 
Tasks designed for adults, on the other hand, are of-
ten suffi  ciently complex that, depending on how a par-
ticipant interprets the social context and task instruc-
tions, she or he may engage in sophisticated reasoning 
without reaching the conclusion indicated by the nor-
mative rules that the researcher intended to assess. Hil-
ton (1995), for example, shows how conversational as-
sumptions and attributions may account for reasonable 
but incorrect responses to a variety of reasoning tasks. 
Th us, early success on some logical tasks and adult fail-
ure on others may mask an underlying developmental 
transition from automatic rule-based inferences to self-
consciously rule-based reasoning. 
Principled Reasoning 
Refl ection on laws may generate a distinction between 
rules and principles. Rules are algorithms that yield a 
determinate answer—for example, laws of deduction, 
arithmetic, or probability. If two individuals are applying 
the same rule in the same circumstance, they must reach 
the same conclusion unless one of them makes a mis-
take. Principles, in contrast, are general guidelines whose 
application involves heuristic judgments. Reasonable 
people may diff er about such judgments. Principled rea-
soning derives from commitment to some set of princi-
ples on the basis of a general metacognitive understand-
ing about the nature and use of principles. 
A variety of theorists have proposed principles implicit 
in everyday inference. Hilton (1995) and Politzer (1986), 
for example, discussed conversational principles that guide 
social interaction. Walton (1996) proposed a set of ar-
gumentation schemes that provide heuristic guidance in 
contexts where formal rules of logic are inadequate. Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1974) identifi ed several judgment 
heuristics routinely applied to probabilistic situations by 
children ( Jacobs & Potenza, 1991) as well as adults. 
In a study of mathematical reasoning, Dixon and 
Moore (1996) presented 116 students in Grades 2, 5, 
8, 11, and college with tasks requiring them to predict 
the temperature that would result from adding one con-
tainer of water to another. Patterns of judgment across 
tasks and verbal protocols were used to identify (a) in-
tuitive principles concerning the eff ects of relative tem-
perature and quantity on the direction and relative mag-
nitude of temperature change and (b) mathematical 
strategies for calculating fi nal temperature. Application 
of appropriate principles increased with age through ad-
olescence and was a necessary, but not suffi  cient, condi-
tion for use of appropriate mathematical strategies. 
Kohlberg (1984) suggested that principled reason-
ing is central to higher levels of moral development. Th e 
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advanced moral reasoner construes morality as a mat-
ter of acting in accord with justifi able principles. Unlike 
moral rules, such principles do not dictate the one right 
solution to a moral dilemma. Rather, they constrain the 
range of acceptable solutions. Kohlberg’s theory, espe-
cially in its later versions, sets stringent structural crite-
ria for principled moral reasoning, with the result that 
such reasoning apparently fails to develop in most peo-
ple and is rarely seen prior to late adolescence. Moshman 
(1995b) proposed a less stringent conception of moral 
principles in the form of metalaws justifying a variety of 
moral rules. Such principles, he suggested, are implicit in 
the understanding and use of moral rules by young chil-
dren and increasingly become explicit objects of refl ec-
tion over a period extending through adolescence. 
Helwig (1995a, in press) and Dunkle (1993) specifi cally 
studied the development of principles related to freedoms 
of expression and religion. Th ey found substantial im-
provement over the course of childhood and adolescence 
in the comprehension, application, justifi cation, and coor-
dination of such principles. Evidence for both early com-
petence and late developmental change notwithstanding, 
it appears that adolescents and adults show forms of prin-
cipled reasoning that are qualitatively superior to the rule-
based inferences of young children (Moshman, 1993).
Available evidence is thus consistent with a general 
trend from the use of implicit principles to the deliber-
ate application of explicit principles (Moshman, 1995b). 
One may thus posit a developmental trend from (a) un-
diff erentiated law-based inferences toward (b) rule-based 
and principled reasoning. 
Scientifi c Reasoning 
Many theorists and researchers have been particularly 
interested in empirical inference, in which the thinker 
generalizes from what is construed as information about 
some aspect of reality. At a primitive level, an individual 
might simply make inductive inferences from available 
data without any intention to generate knowledge. At a 
more advanced level, the individual may intend to make 
inferences in such a way as to yield correct generaliza-
tions about specifi c empirical phenomena and may de-
liberately seek new evidence with this in mind. We may 
call this scientifi c thinking.
In attempting to reach the best generalizations, think-
ers may constrain their inferences in accord with what 
they take to be appropriate norms. A major line of re-
search initiated by Inhelder and Piaget (1958) has as-
sumed that the isolation of variables and correspond-
ing rules of inference are fundamental norms of science. 
Such research indicates developmental trends extend-
ing into adolescence in the successful use of such rules 
(Kuhn & Brannock, 1977). 
Others, however, have argued that scientifi c thinking 
cannot be reduced to some set of rules; rather, it relies 
heavily on heuristic principles. Principled scientifi c rea-
soning might, for example, involve general preferences 
for theories superior in parsimony, explanatory range, 
empirical adequacy, and internal consistency. Samara-
pungavan (1992) found that conformity to some such 
principles can be detected in the scientifi c thinking of 
children as young as age 7, but that there is improve-
ment well beyond that age in the ability to provide ex-
plicit justifi cations based on principles of theory selec-
tion and in the application of such principles to theories 
inconsistent with one’s own beliefs. 
Th eorists have also questioned the common assump-
tion that scientifi c reasoning, at its core, involves seeking 
data that would disconfi rm one’s hypothesis. A number 
of theorists have proposed that confi rmation bias—an 
allegedly irrational tendency to accumulate supportive 
evidence, rather than genuinely testing a hypothesis—
may be better construed as a confi rmation heuristic that 
serves a useful purpose in early phases of scientifi c in-
quiry (Tweney & Chitwood, 1995). Similarly, Koslowski 
and Maqueda (1993) argue that confi rmation and dis-
confi rmation are interrelated aspects of a defensible heu-
ristic approach to testing and revising theories. 
Th ese considerations suggest that scientifi c thinking 
may improve with the development of rule-based and 
principled reasoning and raise the possibility that some 
sorts of law-based reasoning may be suffi  ciently central 
and unique to science as to be designated scientifi c rea-
soning. As we will see, however, questions about the exis-
tence and nature of scientifi c reasoning are complicated 
by indications that scientifi c thinking involves a complex 
dialectical coordination of theories, evidence, and meth-
odologies (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; DeLoache et al., Ch. 
16, this Volume; Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr et al., 
1993; Kuhn et al., 1988, 1995; Kuhn, Schauble, & Gar-
cia-Mila, 1992; Schauble, 1990, 1996). Th e present dis-
cussion of methodological rules and heuristics only be-
gins our consideration of scientifi c reasoning. We will 
return to the topic shortly. 
DIALECTICAL REASONING 
Although the term dialectic is notably protean in its 
meanings, it generally refers to a developmental transfor-
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mation. Cognitive development is construed by many the-
orists as an intrinsically dialectical process. We may de-
fi ne dialectical thinking as the deliberate coordination of 
inferences for the purpose of making cognitive progress. 
Such thinking may be designated as dialectical reasoning 
to the extent that it rests on explicit knowledge about cri-
teria for assessing such progress. Th us, the development of 
dialectical reasoning involves increasingly explicit knowl-
edge about the nature of cognitive development and in-
creasingly deliberate eff orts to further that process. 
Dialectical Refl ection 
In some cases, a thinker believes that a previous concrete 
case provides an appropriate constraint for resolving a 
current issue. I have defi ned the eff ort to apply a pre-
vious case to a current one as case-based reasoning. In 
other cases, a thinker believes that an abstract law pro-
vides the appropriate constraint. I have defi ned the ap-
plication of such a law as law-based reasoning. 
However, there are often a variety of potentially ap-
plicable cases and laws. It is not unusual, moreover, for 
these to point in diff erent directions. With respect to a 
particular moral dilemma, for example, the thinker may 
perceive confl icts among applicable rules, principles, 
and precedents. Moreover, the moral obligations indi-
cated by applicable rules, principles, and precedents may 
be construed as inconsistent with moral intuitions based 
on one’s experience with analogous situations. Deliber-
ate eff orts to achieve coherence by reconstructing one’s 
rules, principles, intuitions, and/or conceptions of prec-
edent may be designated as dialectical refl ection. More 
generally, dialectical refl ection may be defi ned as a de-
liberate eff ort to make conceptual progress through ac-
tive metacognition. 
Basseches (1980, 1984), expanding on the work of 
Riegel (1973), formulated a set of 24 dialectical sche-
mata—forms of thinking that apply sophisticated 
knowledge about structure, relations, context, perspective, 
contradiction, activity, change, and progress. He then in-
terviewed nine fi rst-year college students, nine seniors, 
and nine faculty members about the nature of education 
in order to get samples of reasoning about a complex is-
sue. Th e dialectical schemata turned out to be well rep-
resented in the thinking of these research participants, 
and use of the schemata was positively correlated with 
educational level, consistent with the view that, at least 
among well-educated individuals, dialectical refl ection 
continues to develop through late adolescence and early 
adulthood. Research by Chandler and Boutilier (1992) 
suggests that dialectical reasoning may be critical for un-
derstanding living, social, and other dynamic systems. 
For refl ection to be designated as dialectical reason-
ing, it must involve a deliberate eff ort to apply some cri-
terion of progress. As already suggested, a common and 
important such criterion is increasing coherence. Th us, di-
alectical refl ection may be construed broadly as encom-
passing what Moshman (1995a) called coherence-based 
reasoning. Th is would include both (a) reasoning aimed at 
achieving the temporal coherence of a narrative that un-
folds across time (Feldman, Bruner, Kalmar, & Renderer, 
1993), and (b) reasoning aimed at achieving more abstract 
forms of structural coherence (Fallon, 1987). Although an 
implicit preference for narrative or structural coherence 
may be characteristic even of young children’s cognition 
(Piaget, 1985), the deliberate quest for coherence is use-
fully construed as a form of dialectical reasoning. 
Argumentation 
In many cases, dialectical reasoning is a profoundly so-
cial process. Kuhn (1991) investigated how adolescents 
and adults justify and defend their ideas in the face of al-
ternative interpretations and viewpoints. Although par-
ticipants were interviewed individually, they were chal-
lenged to provide arguments adequate to convince others 
and to respond to potential others who might hold dif-
ferent ideas.
Th e data showed argumentation skills to be far from 
perfect. People frequently failed to justify their own 
ideas and to evaluate alternatives on the basis of relevant 
considerations. Nevertheless, Kuhn provides a picture of 
reasoning as a collaborative process in which people for-
mulate, communicate, criticize, justify, and revise their 
various ideas. Argumentation is usefully construed as a 
process of dialectical reasoning in which two or more in-
dividuals coordinate multiple cases and laws in a shared 
eff ort to make conceptual progress. Th at is, although ar-
guments may be formulated and evaluated by individ-
uals, argumentation is a fundamentally social process 
of collaborative reasoning. A number of studies suggest 
that, in some circumstances, reciprocal argumentation 
among two or more individuals may yield better results 
than individual reasoning (Dimant & Bearison, 1991). 
Moshman and Geil (in press), for example, showed 
qualitatively superior performance in groups of college 
students reasoning about the original and most diffi  cult 
version of the selection task (see earlier discussion un-
der Logical Reasoning) than in individuals faced with the 
same task. Students solved the task either individually or 
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in groups of 5 or 6. Th e groups were instructed to dis-
cuss the task with each other until reaching a consen-
sus. Th us, in addition to the logical reasoning required 
in both conditions, the group condition involved a sus-
tained process of argumentation. Th at is, group members 
engaged in a process of collaborative reasoning in which 
they proposed, justifi ed, criticized, and defended a vari-
ety of potential solutions. 
Th e diff erence between individual and group condi-
tions was stark. Consistent with earlier research using 
this version of the task (Evans, 1989; Newstead & Ev-
ans, 1995), only 9% of students in the individual con-
dition success-fully tested the hypothesized conditional 
relation by systematically seeking evidence that could 
falsify it. In contrast, the correct falsifi cation pattern was 
the consensus response for 75% of the 20 groups. 
In half of the groups, individuals were asked to pro-
pose their own solutions prior to group discussion, thus 
enabling comparison of individual and group solutions. 
Of the 57 students in these 10 groups, 35 switched from 
incorrect to correct response patterns in the course of 
discussion, while only two showed the reverse transi-
tion. Moreover, these changes were not simply a mat-
ter of succumbing to peer pressure. Th e falsifi cation re-
sponse pattern was not initially the most common view 
in any group. Nevertheless, it was the pattern chosen by 
eight of these 10 groups. Th ere were three groups, in fact, 
where not a single individual had initially selected the 
falsifi cation pattern; all three of these groups, however, 
were among those that ultimately selected this pattern as 
the consensus solution. 
Th ese results support a conception of argumentation 
as a rational group process that may, in some circum-
stances, be superior to individual reasoning (Kobayashi, 
1994). Such a conception, in turn, has important impli-
cations for our conception of reasoning. Reasoning is 
traditionally viewed as taking place within an individual. 
An alternative is to view reasoning as a fundamentally 
social process of group interchange, with individual rea-
soning a derivative phenomenon involving internalized 
aspects of the group process (Salmon & Zeitz, 1995). A 
middle-ground possibility is that individual and collab-
orative reasoning are partially distinct and equally fun-
damental, developing via a complex process of recipro-
cal infl uence. 
Legal and Scientifi c Reasoning Revisited 
As noted earlier, precedent often plays a central role 
in legal thinking. It would be too simple, however, to 
identify legal reasoning as a version of precedent-based 
reasoning. Fallon (1987), for example, proposes that 
constitutional interpretation not only involves con-
sideration of (a) precedent, but also of (b) the literal 
meaning of specifi cally relevant provisions of the con-
stitutional text; (c) historical considerations regarding 
the intended meaning of that text; (d) general consid-
erations of constitutional theory; and (e) general eth-
ical principles. Constitutional reasoning, in his view, 
properly involves a process of dialectical refl ection that 
attempts to bring these fi ve considerations into equi-
librium. More generally, it appears that legal thinking 
involves a variety of forms of case-based, law-based, 
and dialectical reasoning.
Scientifi c thinking, it appears, is no less complex. 
Kuhn and her associates (1989; Kuhn et al., 1988, 1992, 
1995; Schauble, 1990, 1996) have investigated scien-
tifi c thinking as a dialectical process involving the co-
ordination of theories and data. As noted earlier, scien-
tifi c thinking can be construed more simply as a matter 
of following methodological rules, such as holding all 
variables but one constant or seeking data that would 
falsify one’s hypothesis. Philosophers of science gener-
ally agree, however, that no set of methodological rules 
provides a direct path to scientifi c truth (R. Kitchener, 
1986). Although acknowledging the role of method-
ological rules, Kuhn and her associates have found that 
(a) people’s theories aff ect the collection and interpre-
tation of data; (b) nevertheless, the resulting evidence 
sometimes leads to appropriate changes in those theo-
ries; and (c) the eff ort to coordinate theories and data 
sometimes leads to refl ection on and reconstruction of 
strategies for knowledge acquisition. Research by Dun-
bar and Klahr (1989; Klahr et al., 1993) has yielded 
similar results (see also DeLoache et al., Ch. 16, this 
Volume). 
In a broad-ranging review of the philosophical and 
psychological literatures on refl ective theory change, 
Chinn and Brewer (1993) noted seven ways that indi-
viduals may respond to anomalous data. 
1.  Th e data may simply be ignored; 
2.  Th e data may be rejected as resulting from meth-
odological error, random processes, or fraud; 
3.  Th e data may be excluded as outside the domain of 
the theory in question; 
4.  Th e data may be held in abeyance pending further 
articulation and development of the theory; 
5.  Th e data may be reinterpreted so as to render them 
consistent with the theory; 
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6.  Peripheral aspects of the theory may be modifi ed 
to accommodate the data; and, 
7. Th ere may be a change in core theoretical 
commitments. 
What happens when one confronts anomalous data 
is a function of many factors, including (a) entrench-
ment of the relevant theory; (b) metatheoretical beliefs 
about theories and theory change; (c) other background 
knowledge; (d) availability of a plausible alternative the-
ory; (e) quality of the alternative theory with respect to 
metatheoretical criteria such as scope, parsimony, empir-
ical support, internal consistency, consistency with other 
theories, and fruitfulness in generating new research; (f ) 
credibility, clarity, and scope of the anomalous data; and 
(g) the extent to which the individual refl ects on the rel-
evant theories and data. 
Developmentally, the ability to distinguish general-
izations from data and apply logical rules concerning the 
relation between these is typically present by age 6 (Ruff -
man, Perner, Olson, & Doherty, 1993; Sodian, Zaitchik, 
& Carey, 1991). Th e ability to construe such general-
izations as hypotheses and evaluate potential sources of 
data, however, continues to develop at least through ad-
olescence (Overton, 1990; Overton et al., 1987; Ward & 
Overton, 1990). Th e ongoing coordination of theories, 
data, and methodologies over a series of investigations, 
moreover, may require processes of dialectical refl ection 
that continue to develop, for some, long beyond child-
hood (Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr et al., 1993; Kuhn, 
1989; Kuhn et al., 1988, 1992, 1995; Schauble, 1990, 
1996). Although demonstrably inadequate strategies 
and interpretations are common at all ages, these stud-
ies have shown developmental progress beyond child-
hood in the ability to deliberately coordinate theories, 
data, and methodologies so as to improve one’s under-
standing. Scientifi c thinking, in other words, appears to 
become increasingly dialectical. 
With these considerations in mind, we may return to 
the earlier questions about legal and scientifi c reasoning. 
Given that there does not appear to be any form of rea-
soning central and unique to thinking about law, it is not 
clear what it means to speak of legal reasoning. Similarly, 
given the lack of evidence for a particular form of rea-
soning central and unique to empirical investigation, it 
may be misleading to speak of scientifi c reasoning. 
A direct comparison of legal and scientifi c think-
ing, however, suggests that they may indeed rest on dis-
tinguishable forms of rationality. Precedent often plays 
a key role in the justifi cation of a legal claim, whereas 
in the scientifi c context, a comparable appeal to history 
or authority would likely be seen as fundamentally ille-
gitimate. Correspondingly, scientifi c respect for empir-
ical data arguably defi nes a form of rationality distinct 
from the precedent-based rationality of law. Such con-
siderations suggest the possibility that various forms of 
case-based, law-based, and dialectical reasoning can be 
coordinated so as to produce new forms of reasoning 
unique to particular domains of knowledge (such as law) 
or types of thinking (such as hypothesis testing). Empir-
ically and conceptually, however, we are a long way from 
knowing what those forms of reasoning might be. 
THE RATIONAL BASIS OF REASONING 
Reasoning, as defi ned earlier, involves constraining one’s 
thinking on the basis of explicit knowledge about vari-
ous mental actions and the justifi ability of their results. 
By defi nition, reasoning is done by a rational agent, one 
who has reasons for his or her beliefs and behavior. In 
this section, I elaborate on the nature and development 
of rationality. 
Metacognitive Understanding 
Research already reviewed suggests that conceptual 
knowledge about cognition begins to emerge during 
childhood but, for most individuals, continues to develop 
at least into adolescence. A strong case can be made that 
the emergence of increasingly sophisticated metacogni-
tive understanding is a central aspect of advanced cogni-
tive development. 
With respect to logical reasoning, for example, we 
have seen that even young children routinely make a va-
riety of correct inferences (Braine, 1990; Hawkins et al., 
1984; Scholnick, 1990; Scholnick & Wing, 1995). Met-
alogical understanding, however—conceptual knowl-
edge about the nature of logic—is a later development. 
Although young children have intuitions of possibil-
ity, impossibility, necessity, and contingency, refl ection 
on the logic of such intuitions generates higher levels 
of understanding about their signifi cance and interrela-
tions (Piaget, 1987; Piaget & Voyat, 1979; Pieraut-Le 
Bonniec, 1980). Recognizing logically necessary rela-
tions of hypothetical possibilities, for example, most ad-
olescents and adults show an appreciation of inferen-
tial validity rarely seen in children much before age 11 
(Markovits & Vachon, 1989; Moshman, 1990; Mosh-
man & Franks, 1986). 
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Similarly, even young children are able to reach a con-
clusion about a hypothesis on the basis of evidence. Re-
search suggests that children begin distinguishing gen-
eralizations from data as early as age 6 (Ruff man, et al., 
1993; Sodian et al., 1991). Th e construction of metathe-
oretical understanding, however, appears to continue at 
least through adolescence. Developing individuals show 
increasing ability to construe generalizations as hypoth-
eses, and to construe data as evidence bearing on those 
hypotheses. Th is may account for the long-term devel-
opment of a deliberate orientation toward isolating vari-
ables, seeking falsifying evidence, and coordinating the-
ories with evidence in ongoing investigations (Kuhn, 
1989, 1991; Kuhn et al., 1988, 1995; Overton, 1990; 
Schauble, 1990, 1996). Th us, with development, the use 
of theories may become increasingly sophisticated be-
cause of the increasing ability to think about theories 
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). 
Th ese fi ndings have important implications for our 
conception of the development of rationality. If we de-
fi ne rationality as correct inference, even young children 
are substantially rational and developmental trends in ra-
tionality are far from robust. If, on the other hand, we de-
fi ne rationality as involving some degree of metacognitive 
understanding about knowledge and thinking, a stronger 
case can be made that rationality develops over a period 
of time that, for many people, extends long beyond child-
hood (Moshman, 1994). Th eoretical conceptions of cog-
nitive development increasingly stress emergence of meta-
cognitive understanding. Campbell and Bickhard (1986), 
for example, defi ne higher stages as higher levels of refl ec-
tion. Taking a somewhat diff erent approach, Demetriou, 
Efklides, and Platsidou (1993) posit a “hypercognitive 
system,” a developing “supersystem” that understands, or-
ganizes, and infl uences other aspects of cognition. 
Th ere remains the question of the relation of metacog-
nitive understanding to reasoning. If metacognitive un-
derstanding were completely unrelated to normatively 
correct reasoning, one might wonder why it develops. 
Moshman (1994) suggests a conception of rationality as 
“metasubjective objectivity,” involving defensible forms 
of reasoning that emerge via refl ection on one’s subjec-
tivity. Correlational evidence indicates positive relation-
ships between metacognitive understanding and norma-
tively appropriate reasoning (Goldman et al., 1982; Kuhn, 
1991; Markovits & Bouff ard-Bouchard, 1992). Microge-
netic research suggests that long-term refl ection on rea-
soning leads not only to knowledge about reasoning, but 
to corresponding improvements in the quality of reason-
ing (Kuhn et al., 1992, 1995; Schauble, 1990, 1996).
Epistemic Cognition 
Epistemic cognition is an aspect of metacognitive un-
derstanding involving knowledge about the nature and 
limits of knowledge, including knowledge about the jus-
tifi ability of various cognitive processes and actions. A 
variety of theories and research programs have addressed 
the development of epistemic cognition (Baxter Ma-
golda, 1992; Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 
1986; Broughton, 1978; Chandler, Boyes, & Ball, 1990; 
King & Kitchener, 1994; K. Kitchener, 1983; Kuhn, 
1991; Orr & Luszcz, 1994; Perry, 1970; Reich, Oser, & 
Valentin, 1994; Schommer, 1994; Schommer & Walker, 
1995; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). 
Research into epistemic cognition typically involves in-
terviewing children, adolescents, and/or adults about the 
justifi cation of knowledge in general and/or about the 
epistemic properties of their own theories and reasoning. 
Th e most systematic approach to the assessment of epis-
temic cognition is the Refl ective Judgment Interview (RJI) 
developed by King and Kitchener (1994). Th e RJI uses a 
semistructured format in which the interviewer presents 
a series of epistemic dilemmas. One such dilemma, for 
example, involves contradictory evidence regarding the 
safety of chemical additives in food. For each dilemma, 
the interviewee is asked about the origin and justifi cation 
of his or her own viewpoint; whether this viewpoint could 
ever be proven correct; why people, including experts, dis-
agree; and how such disagreements should be interpreted 
or resolved. Research with the RJI has provided substan-
tial support for King and Kitchener’s seven-stage model 
of the development of refl ective judgment. 
Although diff ering as to specifi cs and terminology, 
most theorists of epistemic cognition have postulated a 
developmental sequence from objectivist to subjectivist 
to rationalist conceptions of cognition over the course of 
adolescence and early adulthood, with substantial indi-
vidual diff erences in the extent of progress through these 
levels. Th e objectivist construes knowledge as absolute 
and unproblematic. Justifi cation, if considered at all, is 
simply a matter of appealing to direct observation or 
to the pronouncements of an authority. Such epistemic 
conceptions are typical of children and commonly seen 
in adolescents and adults as well. 
Subjectivist conceptions of cognition involve relativist 
epistemologies. Knowledge is deemed to be uncertain, 
ambiguous, idiosyncratic, contextual, and/or subjective; 
justifi cation in any strong or general sense is considered 
impossible. As one subject put it, “I wouldn’t say that 
one person is wrong and another person is right. Each 
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person, I think, has their own truth” (King & Kitchener, 
1994, p. 64). Although some researchers have concluded 
that systematic subjectivism is rarely predominant before 
the college years (King & Kitchener, 1994), there is evi-
dence that relativist conceptions of knowledge are com-
mon among adolescents (Chandler et al., 1990). 
Finally, some individuals appear to make progress 
in late adolescence or beyond toward a more rational-
ist epistemology. Without returning to earlier notions of 
absolute and fi nal truth or abandoning insights regard-
ing context and subjectivity, the rationalist believes there 
are justifi able norms of inquiry such that, in some cases, 
some beliefs reasonably may be deemed to be better jus-
tifi ed than others. Th eory and research on epistemic cog-
nition, then, are consistent with a view of rationality as 
metacognitive in nature and developing, at least in some 
cases, well into adulthood. 
Th ere is also evidence linking epistemic cognition to 
other aspects of cognition. Schommer (1994; Schom-
mer & Walker, 1995) has identifi ed epistemic beliefs 
that predict better comprehension and academic perfor-
mance. Kuhn (1991) has shown a positive relationship 
between holding a rationalist epistemology and skill in 
argumentation. Chandler et al. (1990) provided evidence 
that advanced forms of epistemic cognition are posi-
tively associated with identity formation and negatively 
associated with psychopathology. Th us, epistemic cogni-
tion appears to be interconnected with learning, think-
ing, reasoning, and development. 
Rational Identity 
Although rationality is in part a cognitive phenome-
non, the development of rationality should not be nar-
rowly construed as the development of purely cogni-
tive competencies. Th e ideally rational individual is one 
who spontaneously seeks relevant evidence and alterna-
tive views with the intent of altering his or her beliefs as 
appropriate. Such a person may be conceived as having a 
“critical spirit” (Siegel, 1988). 
Critical spirit is more a matter of disposition than of 
ability. Perkins, Jay, and Tishman (1993) propose that 
good thinking includes dispositions to (a) be open-
minded, fl exible, and adventurous; (b) sustain intellectual 
curiosity; (c) clarify and seek understanding; (d) be plan-
ful and strategic; (e) be intellectually careful; (f ) seek and 
evaluate reasons; and (g) be metacognitive. Although 
such dispositions would be of little use without associ-
ated cognitive abilities, those abilities may remain inert 
without the associated dispositions. 
At a more global level, Cederblom (1989) suggests a 
developmental trend from (a) identifying oneself with 
one’s beliefs toward (b) identifying oneself as a belief-
forming process. To the extent that one identifi es one-
self with one’s beliefs, any threat to those beliefs is likely 
to be seen as a threat to the self. Th us, even if one has the 
cognitive competence to change those beliefs appropri-
ately, one is likely to resist evidence or arguments that 
suggest such change is necessary. To the extent that one 
identifi es oneself as a belief-forming process, however, 
one is more likely to apply one’s rational competencies. 
In this latter case, one construes the process of appropri-
ately changing one’s beliefs as confi rming one’s identity 
as a rational agent. 
Rationality, then, transcends cognition to include mo-
tivational and dispositional considerations. Th e develop-
ment of rationality is best construed as including the for-
mation of a variety of intellectual dispositions and, more 
broadly, a critical spirit and a rational identity.
THE REFLECTIVE CONSTRUCTION OF 
RATIONALITY 
I have proposed that advanced cognitive development 
is in large part the development of reasoning—that is, 
epistemologically self-constrained thinking. Reasoning, 
thus defi ned, is done by a rational agent—that is, an in-
dividual whose thinking is rooted in epistemic forms of 
metacognitive understanding. It follows that cognitive 
development beyond childhood consists largely of the 
development of rationality. 
Now turn to questions of developmental process. In 
the present section, I present two approaches to account-
ing for the development of rationality—causal determin-
ism and rational constructivism. Highlighting the latter, 
I conclude that rationality is best construed as a meta-
cognitive phenomenon constructed through active pro-
cesses of refl ection. 
Causal Determinism 
A standard form of scientifi c explanation is to sug-
gest that some event or process is caused by some other 
event or process. For example, if object A collides with 
stationary object B and the latter immediately begins to 
move, we are likely to explain the motion of B as caused 
by the impact of A. Causal explanations raise a variety of 
philosophical questions and become increasingly prob-
lematic as one moves from (a) physical interactions of 
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macroscopic objects to (b) biological processes of ana-
tomic and physiological development, then to (c) psy-
chological processes of elementary behavioral develop-
ment, and fi nally to (d) advanced cognitive development. 
In the present subsection, I consider three variations of 
the causal determinist approach and some limitations of 
each (Table 19.1). 
Th e universalist maturationist approach makes the na-
tivist assumption that cognitive development is an epi-
genetic process directed by genetic programs universal 
across the human species. Genes, in this view, not only 
play a role in cognitive development, but have primary 
responsibility for directing its course. 
Th e proposition that genes infl uence cognitive devel-
opment is not controversial. Characteristics of the human 
genome undoubtedly aff ect the course of cognitive de-
velopment (Karmiloff -Smith, 1992; Spelke & Newport, 
Ch. 6, Volume 1) and infl uence the nature of advanced 
human cognition. A number of neo-Piagetian theories, 
moreover, have suggested age-related constraints on cog-
nitive development, perhaps due to changes related to 
processing capacity (Case, Ch. 15, this Volume; Deme-
triou & Efklides, 1994; Demetriou et al., 1993; de Rib-
aupierre & Pascual-Leone, 1979; Halford, 1993; John-
son-Laird, 1990; Lamborn et al., 1994; Marini & Case, 
1994). Although the explanation of such constraints is a 
matter of dispute, it seems plausible that they refl ect ge-
netically-based maturation of the nervous system. 
Even if nervous system maturation plays a role in 
later cognitive development, however, there do not ap-
pear to be genetically based “critical periods” for such 
development (Kuhn et al., 1995). Th ere is a fundamental 
diff erence, moreover, between the views that genes con-
strain development and that they determine its course. 
Th ere is no evidence that the structure of advanced cog-
nition is genetically determined. Substantial individual 
and cultural diff erences with respect to advanced cogni-
tion, in fact, are diffi  cult to reconcile with a universalist 
maturationist metatheory. No current theorist, to my 
knowledge, proposes that advanced cognitive develop-
ment is a causal process directed by the genes. 
Th e relativist enculturationist approach suggests that 
cultures diff er in fundamental ways with respect to 
what is deemed to be advanced cognition. Changes in 
advanced cognition involve the inculcation of cultur-
ally valued skills and ideas and are unique to particular 
cultures. Indeed, from this perspective, there is no such 
thing as advanced cognition except within the context of 
a particular culture. 
Culture and cognition are indeed intricately inter-
related across the lifespan (Rogoff , 1990, Ch. 14, this 
Volume; Rogoff  & Chavajay, 1995). Available evidence 
provides little or no support, however, for a determin-
ist view that late cognitive changes are directly caused 
by forces unique to particular cultures. Even if envi-
ronmental forces do exert some degree of causal infl u-
ence, moreover, there are major conceptual diffi  culties 
for any suggestion that such changes constitute cogni-
tive development. 
An interactionist contextualist view would suggest that 
later changes in cognition are generated by complex on-
going interactions of genetic and environmental (in-
cluding cultural) factors. One would therefore expect 
substantial variability in pathways of cognitive change. 
Such pathways, in fact, might be largely unique to par-
ticular individuals. Again, this casts considerable doubt 
on the existence of forms of cognition that are in some 
general sense advanced and raises questions about what 
changes in cognition, if any, are in some general sense 
developmental. 
Interactionist contextualism is a more plausible and 
sophisticated perspective than either genetic or cul-
tural determinism. Th e idea that genetic and environ-
mental forces interact throughout the course of devel-
opment, in fact, is fully consistent with a constructivist 
metatheory. Th e conceptual and empirical problems with 
construing genetic and environmental factors as causal 
forces that determine developmental change, however, 
are not resolved simply by recognizing the complex in-
teractions of such factors. In particular, it is diffi  cult to 
see how any causal determinist view can account for the 
sort of epistemic self-understanding that marks progress 
in rationality. 
Rational Constructivism 
A rational constructivist perspective emphasizes the ac-
tive role of the developing individual in constructing 
TABLE 19.1 Th eoretical Approaches to Advanced Cognitive 
Development 
Developmental  Basis for develop-  Nature of develop- 
    Paradigm      mental change      mental pathways 
Universalist  Genetic  Psychologically 
    Maturationist      determinism      universal 
Relativist  Cultural  Unique to 
    Enculturationist    determinism      each culture 
Interactionist  Interaction of genes  Unique to each 
    Contextualist      and environment      individual 
Rational  Refl ective construction  Epistemologically 
    Constructivist      by rational agent      universal 
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advanced forms of cognition that transcend less ade-
quate earlier forms. Th e result is an ongoing progress to-
ward higher levels of rationality. Th eorists in this tradi-
tion typically postulate developmental sequences that are 
deemed to have epistemological validity across cultures. 
Because the construction of advanced cognition may be 
facilitated or hindered by a variety of individual and cul-
tural factors, individual and cultural diff erences in the 
rate and extent of progress through these idealized stages 
are likely. Th us, although the stages have some degree of 
epistemic universality, psychological progress through 
them need not be universal. 
Rational constructivism, by postulating a rational 
agent, may provide a more plausible account of prog-
ress in rationality than any version of the causal deter-
minist perspective. Without denying the importance 
and interactive nature of genetic and environmental 
infl uences, rational constructivist theories emphasize 
the mediating role of the epistemic subject as an ac-
tive force in its own development (R. Kitchener, 1986; 
Smith, 1993). 
Th ere remains, however, the problem of accounting 
for the origin of rational agency. A plausible develop-
mental scenario is that an interaction of genetic and en-
vironmental forces produces an active biological agent, 
which transforms itself into an active cognitive agent, 
which increasingly constructs an ability to refl ect on its 
own cognition, thus transforming itself into a rational 
agent that, to some extent, acts on the basis of its own 
reasons. Th us, a causal determinist view may be helpful 
in explaining the prenatal beginnings of developmental 
change. A constructivist worldview, with its emphasis on 
the active organism, becomes more and more relevant, 
however. With further development, moreover, the pro-
cess of construction becomes increasingly cognitive and 
ultimately self-refl ective, thus generating the sort of ra-
tional agent whose actions are best understood from a 
rational constructivist perspective. 
For a rational constructivist, then, development occurs 
not as a result of genes, environment, or some interac-
tion of the two, but as a result of active cognitive refl ec-
tion (Berkowitz & Keller, 1994; Kitchener, 1986; Piaget, 
1985; Smith, 1993). By refl ecting on current cognition, 
the thinker may reconstruct his or her own cognitions 
in such a way as to render their implicit properties ex-
plicit (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Karmiloff -Smith, 
1992). As we have seen, for example, refl ection on the 
logical necessity implicit in one’s deductive inferences 
may be central to the construction of deductive reason-
ing (Moshman, 1990). 
Refl ection is an inferential process, however, and 
at higher levels, is usefully construed as an act of rea-
soning. Rational constructivism thus directs our atten-
tion to reasoning as both a context for, and a process of, 
development. 
Reasoning and Development 
A rational constructivist perspective suggests that rea-
soning is not only a product of refl ection, but also a con-
text for further refl ection and thus, further development. 
In the process of applying analogical relations, prece-
dents, rules, and/or principles, one is likely to refl ect on 
one’s reasoning in such a way as to generate higher levels 
of epistemic understanding and, over the long run, bet-
ter reasoning. 
With respect to the role of reasoning in development, 
however, there is an important distinction to be made 
between (a) case-based and law-based reasoning and 
(b) dialectical reasoning. Although case-based and law-
based reasoning may generate refl ection and, in time, de-
velopmental change, they are not developmental pro-
cesses per se. Dialectical reasoning, on the other hand, is 
usefully construed as a self-conscious form of the devel-
opmental process of refl ection. 
Consider, for example, an individual who applies a 
moral principle to resolve some dilemma. If the princi-
ple is merely implicit in his or her processing of infor-
mation, this would be an example of inference, but not 
reasoning. If the individual understands the principle as 
a principle and deliberately applies it because it is per-
ceived as morally relevant, this would be reasoning. Pro-
vided the dilemma is adequately resolved, however, there 
may be no further refl ection on the principle. 
If, however, the individual is motivated to engage in 
extended refl ection on the principle, including its justifi -
ability and its relation to other principles, this may lead 
to a qualitatively higher level of moral understanding 
and thus constitute a developmental transition. At the 
very least, we may suggest that such refl ection involves 
an implicit dialectic. To the extent that the individual 
perceives diffi  culties with his or her current set of princi-
ples and intentionally coordinates and reconstructs them 
for the purpose of achieving a higher level of moral un-
derstanding, we may posit a process of dialectical refl ec-
tion that is simultaneously a process of reasoning and a 
process of development. 
Important developmental changes in cognition may 
also be generated by extended argumentation. Argumen-
tation may not only be a context that encourages refl ec-
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tion, but may also enable the co-construction of a collec-
tive rationality that serves as a particularly useful object 
of refl ection. Peer discussion of a moral dilemma, for ex-
ample, may generate a set of principles, including asso-
ciated justifi cations, critiques, responses, and rejoinders, 
that constitute a collective structure of moral under-
standing none of the participants could have generated 
alone. Refl ection on this structure may, for some of those 
participants, contribute to progress in moral understand-
ing. A variety of theorists have emphasized the epistemic 
and developmental signifi cance of argumentation among 
peers (Goldman, 1994; Habermas, 1990; Kuhn, 1991; 
Moshman, 1995a, 1995b; Piaget, 1924/1972; Salmon & 
Zeitz, 1995; Youniss & Damon, 1992), and there is sub-
stantial evidence for the role of peer interaction in devel-
opmental change (Dimant & Bearison, 1991; Kobayashi, 
1994). 
In a microgenetic study of combinatorial reason-
ing, for example, Dimant and Bearison (1991) had col-
lege students, over a series of six sessions, engage in in-
crementally more complex versions of a task in which 
they had to determine what combination of chemicals 
would generate a particular change in color. Some stu-
dents worked on the task individually and others in dy-
ads. All were pretested and posttested individually on a 
task requiring them to systematically generate all possi-
ble combinations of fi ve candies. 
For students in the dyadic condition, each speech act 
was coded using a system of categories designed to dis-
tinguish (a) collaborative engagement, in which indi-
viduals agree, disagree, ask questions, or supply explana-
tions, from (b) speech acts not considered theoretically 
relevant to cognitive development. Collaborative en-
gagement increased over the course of the six sessions. 
Pretest-posttest gains in combinatorial reasoning were 
greater for (a) students in dyads with above-average lev-
els of collaborative engagement than for (b) students in 
dyads with below-average levels of collaborative engage-
ment or (c) students who worked alone. Th e latter two 
groups did not diff er, nor was there any eff ect for the-
oretically irrelevant speech acts. Th e developmental im-
pact of peer interaction was apparently a function of the 
quality of argumentation. 
In contrast to case-based and law-based reasoning, 
then, dialectical reasoning—including dialectical refl ec-
tion and argumentation—is not only a context for devel-
opmental refl ection, but a developmental force in itself. 
With the rise of dialectical forms of reasoning, the study 
of reasoning becomes indistinguishable from the study 
of development. Dialectical reasoning is, in fact, usefully 
construed as an eff ort to take control of one’s cognitive 
development. 
TOWARD A PLURALIST RATIONAL 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Th is rational constructivist metatheory, I suggest, is best 
able to account for the developing rationality that is cen-
tral, in my view, to advanced cognitive development. 
Th e most familiar theoretical instantiation of the ratio-
nal constructivist paradigm is Piaget’s theory of cogni-
tive development, which proposes the rational construc-
tion of structures that are general across domains and 
universal across persons and cultures, culminating in for-
mal operations as the highest stage of cognitive devel-
opment. Now consider evidence for cognitive variability 
that suggests a pluralist-rather than universalist-version 
of rational constructivism. 
It should be emphasized that pluralist rational con-
structivism leaves open the possibility that there may 
be forms of advanced cognition that have a consider-
able degree of generality across cognitive domains and/
or universality across individuals and cultures. Th ere is 
substantial evidence for such generalities and universal-
ities. Pluralist rational constructivism assumes, however, 
that there are also important forms of advanced cogni-
tion specifi c to particular domains, individuals, and/or 
cultures. 
Specifi city and Generality Revisited 
Piaget proposed formal operations as a general struc-
ture of advanced cognition applicable to all domains of 
knowledge. It is possible, however, to construe logic as 
a domain and formal operations as the structure of ad-
vanced cognition within this domain, rather than as a 
general stage of development. Recent theories have pro-
posed specifi c forms, structures, or processes of advanced 
cognition not only with respect to logic (Efklides et al., 
1994; Markovits, 1993; Moshman, 1990), but in domains 
such as morality (Helwig, 1995b; Kohlberg, 1984), per-
spective taking (Selman, 1980), narrative interpretation 
(Feldman et al., 1993), and refl ective judgment (King & 
Kitchener, 1994). 
Th e domains potentially relevant to advanced cog-
nitive development constitute a heterogeneous set that 
overlap each other in complex ways. Even if there are 
aspects of cognition specifi c to logic and other aspects 
specifi c to morality, for example, logic and morality do 
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not appear to be domains in the same sense. Morality, 
for example, arguably involves a particular type of con-
tent, whereas logic is applicable to a variety of types of 
content, including morality. Whatever the evidence for 
domain specifi city of cognition, it is doubtful that ad-
vanced cognitive development consists of independent 
developmental transitions in some fi nite number of dis-
tinct domains. 
As suggested earlier, it is important to avoid a sim-
plistic choice as to whether advanced cognition is do-
main specifi c or general across domains. Rather, I pro-
posed a focus on reasoning and distinguished four ways 
in which reasoning could be specifi c or general. 
1. Th ere could be forms of reasoning unique to particu-
lar domains of knowledge and inference such as phys-
ical causality, biological systems, social relations, or 
morality;
2. Th ere could be forms of reasoning unique to particu-
lar types of thinking, such as problem solving, deci-
sion making, or hypothesis testing, though these types 
of thinking may be applicable to multiple domains of 
knowledge and inference; 
3. Th ere could be two or more distinct forms of reason-
ing, each of which is applicable to multiple types of 
thinking and multiple domains of knowledge and in-
ference; and 
4. Th ere could be generalities that transcend particular 
forms of reasoning. 
To further complicate matters, it is important to dis-
tinguish epistemological from psychological consider-
ations with respect to specifi city and generality. In com-
paring two domains of knowledge, for example, we must 
distinguish (a) the epistemological question of whether 
it is possible to identify a form of reasoning applicable 
to both domains (epistemic generality) from (b) the psy-
chological question of whether the development of that 
form of reasoning is general across domains (psycho-
logical generality). Even if a given form of reasoning is 
broadly applicable (epistemic generality), for instance, 
the application of such reasoning in multiple domains 
of knowledge may develop independently (psychologi-
cal specifi city). Without some conceptual basis for sug-
gesting some sort of epistemic generality, however, psy-
chological research on questions of generality may be 
meaningless. Inquiry into questions of specifi city and 
generality, then, requires ongoing coordination of epis-
temological analysis concerning the nature and appli-
cability of various forms of reasoning and psychological 
research concerning synchronies and asynchronies in de-
velopmental change. 
A number of researchers have addressed questions of 
specifi city and generality with respect to reasoning about 
the physical and social worlds. Marini and Case (1994), 
for example, assessed levels of performance on (a) the 
Piagetian balance beam task (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) 
and (b) a newly designed personality diagnosis task, re-
quiring ability to identify abstract personality traits and 
use these to predict behavior. Four levels of complexity 
applicable to reasoning on both tasks were identifi ed. 
Assessing 80 individuals ranging in age from 9 to 19, 
they found that most showed identical levels of perfor-
mance on the two tasks, and almost all the rest diff ered 
by just one level. Without suggesting identical rates of 
development in the two domains, they concluded that a 
general potential for abstract reasoning typically devel-
ops about age 11 or 12 and can be observed in multiple 
domains under suitable experimental conditions. 
Th e case for psychological and developmental gen-
erality is greatly strengthened by results from microge-
netic research. In one such study, Kuhn et al. (1995) pre-
sented physical and social content to fourth graders and 
adults each week for a period of ten weeks. Participants 
generated and tested theories in their eff orts to compre-
hend the causal relations in each domain. Developmen-
tal change in reasoning strategies was found for both age 
groups and, at each age, generalized across content. Th e 
authors concluded that both the children and the adults 
were constructing reasoning strategies applicable to both 
knowledge domains and were able to apply those strat-
egies to a domain diff erent than the domain in which 
they were constructed. 
In still another approach to the generality of ad-
vanced cognition, Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, and Roe-
del (1995) assessed 269 college students in multiple do-
mains with respect to both cognitive performance and 
several aspects of self-monitoring. Th e resulting pat-
tern of correlations suggested that monitoring compe-
tence is neither entirely general nor entirely specifi c to 
domains. Acknowledging the importance of domain-
specifi c knowledge, the authors concluded that moni-
toring within domains is in part a function of general 
metacognitive processes. In sum, studies diff ering greatly 
in design and focus provide converging evidence for the 
generality of advanced cognition across content. (For re-
lated research and theory, see Case, Ch. 15, this Volume; 
Chandler & Boutilier, 1992; Klahr et al., 1993; Kosonen 
& Winne, 1995; Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn et al., 1992; Nisbett 
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et al., 1987; Schauble, 1996; Schommer & Walker, 1995; 
Smith et al., 1992.) 
Although research of this sort undercuts strong ver-
sions of domain specifi city, it provides little reason to 
think that advanced cognitive development can be un-
derstood as progress along a single developmental 
pathway toward a general structural endpoint. I have 
already proposed that case-based, law-based, and dia-
lectical reasoning constitute distinct forms of reason-
ing, each of which may include two or more distinct 
variants (e.g., analogical versus precedent-based forms 
of case-based reasoning). It is well-established, more-
over, that even young children have richly structured 
domain-specifi c knowledge and there is substantial ev-
idence that such domains remain important beyond 
childhood (Helwig, 199513). Schauble (1996) provides 
detailed examples of the many ways specifi c knowledge 
aff ects the reasoning people use and the conclusions 
they reach. Pluralist rational constructivism does not 
assume that every identifi able domain constitutes its 
own form of rationality, thus generating its own form 
of reasoning, but neither does it rule out the possibil-
ity of domain-specifi c forms of rationality and reason-
ing. Th e earlier discussions concerning the nature and 
existence of legal and scientifi c reasoning illustrate the 
complexity of the theoretical and empirical questions 
that arise in this regard. 
Whether the present analysis is seen as supportive of 
domain specifi city or of domain generality depends on 
one’s perspective. From the standpoint of Piaget’s the-
ory of formal operations, the present emphasis on sev-
eral qualitatively distinct forms of reasoning may seem a 
move toward domain specifi city, with each form of rea-
soning potentially constituting a distinct domain of de-
velopment. On the other hand, the proposed forms of 
reasoning are applicable to multiple types of thinking 
and multiple domains of knowledge. Analogical reason-
ing, for example, can be used in solving problems, mak-
ing decisions, and conceptualizing relationships with re-
spect to a wide variety of physical, biological, social, and 
moral phenomena (DeLoache et al., Ch. 16, this Vol-
ume; Halford, 1992). From the standpoint of a theory 
emphasizing distinct types of thinking or distinct do-
mains of knowledge, the present approach would seem 
domain general in its emphasis on broadly applicable 
forms of reasoning. 
Evidence for distinct forms of reasoning applicable 
to multiple types of thinking and multiple domains of 
knowledge and inference, then, suggests a conception of 
advanced cognitive development more pluralist than that 
of Piaget, but nonetheless general in important ways. It 
remains to be seen whether it will be possible to identify 
specifi c forms of reasoning, rooted in specifi c forms of 
rationality, that are unique and central to particular types 
of thinking and/or to particular domains of knowledge 
and inference. 
Human Diversity and Universality 
Cognitive variability may also be present or absent with 
respect to various biological and/or social groupings of 
individuals. Some studies, for example, have shown sta-
tistically signifi cant diff erences between males and fe-
males in the prevalence of various forms of advanced 
cognition (Foltz et al., 1995; King & Kitchener, 1994; R. 
Orr & Luszcz, 1994; Shaklee et al., 1988; Walker, 1991; 
Wark & Krebs, 1996). Most theorists and researchers 
conclude from such diff erences that, in a given culture at 
a given point in its history, one gender may be somewhat 
more likely than the other to show certain forms of ad-
vanced cognition, due largely to diff erences in the social-
ization and experiences of males and females in that cul-
tural context (Baxter Magolda, 1992). 
Some theorists, however, have proposed that there 
are innate, fundamental, and/or essential diff erences be-
tween men and women such that certain developmen-
tal pathways and/or forms of advanced cognition may 
be considered prototypically masculine and others pro-
totypically feminine (Labouvie-Vief, Orwoll, & Manion, 
1995). It has been suggested, for example, that women 
use diff erent logics than men (D. Orr, 1989), that they 
have diff erent “ways of knowing” (Belenky et al., 1986), 
and that they typically construe moral issues in terms of 
care, compassion and relationships, whereas men focus 
on rights, justice, and autonomy (Gilligan, 1982). 
Research has not supported the stronger claims of 
fundamental sex diff erences. With respect to morality, 
for example, it appears that both men and women are 
capable of both care and justice reasoning; how an indi-
vidual thinks depends more on the nature of the moral 
dilemma than the gender of the thinker (Helwig, 1995a, 
in press; Jadack, Hyde, Moore, & Keller, 1995; Walker, 
1991; Wark & Krebs, 1996). Similarly, research on log-
ical reasoning, mathematical reasoning, epistemic cog-
nition, and argumentation generally shows sex diff er-
ences to be minimal, if they are found at all (Chandler et 
al., 1990; King & Kitchener, 1994; Kosonen & Winne, 
1995; Kuhn, 1991; Moshman & Franks, 1986; R. Orr & 
Luszcz, 1994; Shaklee et al., 1988). 
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Overall, there is no evidence for any form of ad-
vanced cognition that is common among men but rare 
in women, or vice versa (Menssen, 1993). Correspond-
ingly, there is little support for theories postulating qual-
itatively distinct pathways of late cognitive development 
for females and males. Even theorists who continue to 
highlight the role of gender in advanced cognition main-
tain complex and ambivalent positions on the question 
of sex diff erences (Baxter Magolda, 1992; Clinchy, 1995; 
Labouvie-Vief et al., 1995). 
Culture may be a more important variable than gen-
der with respect to advanced cognitive development 
(Rogoff , 1990; Rogoff  & Chavajay, 1995). Two key ques-
tions about the relation of advanced cognition to culture 
are as follows: Are there forms of advanced cognition 
that are specifi c to particular cultures? Are there forms of 
advanced cognition that are common to diverse cultures? 
Each of these questions has a developmental counter-
part: Are there developmental pathways specifi c to par-
ticular cultures? Are there developmental pathways tra-
versed by individuals in many, and perhaps all, cultures? 
Th e most systematic body of cross-cultural research 
on advanced cognitive development derives from Kohl-
berg’s theory of moral development. It appears that the 
moral reasoning of individuals in a wide variety of cul-
tures can be classifi ed and understood with respect to 
Kohlberg’s stages (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Snarey, 1985). 
Th e evidence is consistent with the view that these stages 
emerge in an invariant sequence, though strong tests of 
this are limited to a narrow range of cultures. Th ere are 
substantial diff erences both within and across cultures in 
how far individuals progress. 
Even within the domain of morality, however, there 
is evidence that certain forms of cognition are associ-
ated with certain cultures; we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility of developmental pathways specifi c to particular 
cultures or individuals (Campbell & Christopher, 1996; 
Moshman, 1995b). Given the paucity of cross-cultural 
evidence in other domains of advanced cognitive devel-
opment, we must be cautious about any strong conclu-
sions concerning the nature of human diversity and the 
extent of universality. Further research is likely to reveal 
both (a) forms of cognition appearing in adolescence or 
adulthood that are specifi c to particular individuals or 
cultures and (b) forms of cognition that may be deemed 
advanced in a general sense and that, even if not uni-
versal across individuals, are found in suffi  ciently devel-
oped individuals from a variety of cultures. Correspond-
ingly, it continues to be a reasonable working hypothesis 
that cognitive development beyond childhood includes: 
(a) progress along developmental pathways that are uni-
versal across cultures; (b) progress along pathways that 
are arguably developmental but specifi c to particular cul-
tures; and (c) progress along pathways that are arguably 
developmental but specifi c to particular individuals. 
With respect to universalities in advanced cognition, 
for example, some plausible candidates are: (a) hypo-
thetico-deductive reasoning; (b) principled reasoning; 
(c) precedent- based reasoning; (d) deliberate coordina-
tion of theories with evidence; (e) systematic strategies 
for testing hypotheses; (f ) dialectical argumentation; and 
(g) rationalist conceptions of knowledge. Th is is not to 
say such forms of advanced cognition are likely to be 
found to be the predominant modes of thinking in all 
adults in all cultures. On the contrary, as we have seen, 
there is already substantial evidence against this. It may 
turn out, however, that such forms of cognition exist in 
a variety of cultures among individuals who, according to 
epistemic criteria that transcend any particular culture, 
may be deemed advanced in their cognition. It may also 
turn out that those who achieve these or other forms of 
advanced cognition do so by progressing through the 
same sequence of stages, though again, the universal-
ity of the sequences may be more epistemological than 
psychological. 
With respect to diversities, there may be some forms 
of advanced cognition specifi c to particular cultures or 
individuals. Constitutional reasoning, for example, may 
be a particular synthesis of rule-based, principled, and 
precedent-based reasoning constructed only within spe-
cialized contexts in cultures with a particular kind of le-
gal system (Fallon, 1987). In some cases, an individual 
may progress through a unique series of conceptual rev-
olutions to an advanced and novel form of understand-
ing, as in the case of Darwin’s construction of the theory 
of evolution through natural selection (Gruber, 1974). 
Individuals may construct their own domains of knowl-
edge, and such domains may vary across cultures, thus 
adding another dimension to the issues of specifi city 
and generality discussed earlier in this section (Camp-
bell & Christopher, 1996; Moshman, 1995b; Rybash et 
al., 1986). 
Universalist rational constructivism suggests that 
forms of cognition specifi c to particular individuals and 
cultures are special cases of more fundamental and uni-
versal forms of advanced cognition. Th is cannot be as-
sumed in advance, however. Pluralist rational construc-
tivism, without denying the existence and importance of 
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universals, suggests that open-minded investigation of 
individuals and cultures may reveal advanced and funda-
mental forms of cognition undreamt of in our universal-
ist psychologies (Campbell & Christopher, 1996; Miller 
& Cook-Greuter, 1994; Moshman, 1995b). 
In sum, it is doubtful that late cognitive changes move 
exclusively toward or through formal operations, and un-
clear whether they approach any other general and uni-
versal endpoint. Current research and theory suggest the 
value of pluralist rational constructivism, a metatheoreti-
cal perspective within which active construction by ratio-
nal agents is assumed, but generality across domains and 
universality across persons and cultures are open empiri-
cal and conceptual questions. 
CONCLUSION 
Does cognition develop beyond childhood? As we have 
seen, there is much evidence for long-term changes in 
cognition beyond childhood. Early in this chapter, I pro-
posed that long-term changes are usefully construed as 
developmental if they are qualitative, progressive, and 
internally directed. I anticipated that some long-term 
changes in cognition beyond childhood are develop-
mental in this sense, but that advanced cognitive devel-
opment may not have other characteristics typically as-
sociated with developmental change. We now return to 
these issues. 
Qualitative Change 
Piaget’s (1924/1972) theory of formal reasoning pos-
tulated the emergence of hypothetico-deductive reason-
ing at age 11 or 12. Hypothetico-deductive reasoning, 
for Piaget, was not a narrow technical skill but a self-
conscious coordination of logic and hypothesis—or, in 
the language of Piaget (1987), of necessities and possi-
bilities—that defi ned a new and fi nal stage of cognitive 
development. Th e later theory of formal operations (In-
helder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget 194711960) proposed a 
logical structure central to this fi nal stage. 
Th e theory of formal operations-strictly construed 
as the logical model proposed by Inhelder and Piaget 
(1958) no longer plays much role in the literature. A va-
riety of neo-Piagetian theories posit the construction 
of cognitive structures, variously defi ned and character-
ized, and propose that such structures achieve higher 
levels of abstraction beginning age 11 or 12 (Case, Ch. 
15, this Volume). Other theorists, however, focus more 
on level of metacognitive refl ection (Campbell & Bick-
hard, 1986; Kuhn, 1989, 1991; Moshman, 1990, 1994, 
1995b). Although no one doubts that cognition is highly 
organized, the nature and breadth of advanced cognitive 
structures remains a matter of uncertainty and dispute. 
I have suggested that three forms of reasoning—case-
based, law-based, and dialectical—can be distinguished, 
with the possibility that these can be diff erentiated and/
or coordinated to generate additional forms of reason-
ing. Th ere is substantial evidence that some such forms 
of reasoning are general across domains of knowledge 
and inference (Kuhn et al., 1995; Marini & Case, 1994; 
Schauble, 1996), but this does not rule out the possibil-
ity that we will identify types of thinking or forms of 
reasoning specifi c to such domains. It appears that ad-
vanced cognition is both specifi c and general in multi-
ple ways. 
Although we have much to learn about matters of 
specifi city, generality, and structure, the case for qualita-
tive change in cognition beyond childhood is strong. Ad-
olescents and adults show forms of reasoning and levels 
of understanding qualitatively diff erent from the cogni-
tion of children (Basseches, 1984; Campbell & Bickhard, 
1986; Case, Ch. 15, this Volume; Chandler & Boutilier, 
1992; Commons et al., 1984; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; 
King & Kitchener, 1994; Kohlberg, 1984; Kuhn, 1989; 
Markovits, 1993; Moshman, 1990, 1993, 1995b; O’Brien, 
1987; Overton, 1990). In fact, there is surprisingly strong 
support for Piaget’s 1924 proposal that formal or hypo-
thetico-deductive reasoning—deliberate deduction from 
propositions consciously recognized as hypothetical—
plays an important role in the thinking of adolescents and 
adults but is rarely seen much before the age of 11 or 12 
(Markovits & Vachon, 1989; Moshman & Franks, 1986). 
Th e stronger support for the original theory of formal 
reasoning than for the structural theory of formal opera-
tions suggests that what emerges at about age 11 may not 
be a better logic, but a deeper level of refl ection about the 
nature of logic, theory, and evidence (Campbell & Bick-
hard, 1986; Kuhn, 1989; Moshman, 1990). 
Progressive Change 
Th ere appears to be a consensus that many of the qual-
itative changes in cognition beyond childhood observed 
in developmental research represent progress (R. Kitch-
ener, 1986). Th e consensus may be due in part to the fo-
cus of so much research on aspects of logic or mathemat-
ics where the superiority of some cognitions to others 
seems clear. 
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Th e consensus may also be due in part, however, to 
the narrow range of cultures represented by most the-
orists and research participants. Pluralist rational con-
structivism suggests the need for more data on advanced 
cognition in multiple cultures and the corresponding 
need for more epistemological analysis of what consti-
tutes advanced cognition and how progress in cognition 
can be identifi ed in a manner that is not completely rel-
ative to culture. 
Th e present analysis suggests ongoing transitions 
that are arguably progressive in a general sense. Th e 
emergence of thinking involves the deliberate coordi-
nation of inferences and thus represents a higher level 
of intentionality and complexity. Th e emergence of rea-
soning involves increasingly explicit knowledge about 
the epistemic properties of one’s inferences, thus rep-
resenting a higher level of refl ection. It remains unclear 
toward what endpoints, if any, cognition tends, but 
such endpoints may not be necessary to identify cogni-
tive progress.
Refl ective Construction 
I have suggested that advanced cognition is constructed 
via a process of dialectical refl ection that coordinates 
multiple cognitions and renders their implicit properties 
explicit. It is in this sense that later cognitive changes, 
without being genetically determined, may be said to be 
internally directed and thus developmental. Pluralist ra-
tional constructivism suggests there may be forms of ad-
vanced cognition unique to individuals, forms associated 
with particular cultures, and forms universal across many 
or all cultures. Although some plausible universals have 
been proposed, evidence relevant to questions of univer-
sality and diversity is sparse and ambiguous. 
Existing research and theory are suffi  cient, however, 
to suggest that advanced cognitions are not only con-
structed via refl ection, but serve as a means of further 
refl ection. Such refl ection takes place in individuals, in 
groups, and in diverse cultural contexts. Our scientifi c 
eff orts to understand cognition and development, more-
over, are themselves refl ective and constructive, generat-
ing theories of cognition that are themselves sophisti-
cated forms of cognition. 
It becomes increasingly diffi  cult at higher levels to 
separate the application of cognition, the study of cogni-
tion, and the process of cognitive development. In both 
its universal and plural aspects, cognition develops be-
yond childhood via refl ective processes that are simulta-
neously individual, social, and rational. 
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